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THE APHORISMS

OF THE

NYÁYA.

SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

PART II.

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A. or. 4713(2)

Gautama

NYAYA PHILOSOPHY

SAUTANTRA

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL

BOOK II

PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE BENGAL COLLEGE
BY JAMES BROWN, J. B. 17

ALLAHABAD

PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
BY J. B. 17, J. B. 17

1863

100 pages, 50 copies—Price 15 annas

1877

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CHURCH OF THE LIVING GOD


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
ALLAHABAD:

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS.

REV. L. G. HAY, *Superintendent.*

1853.

[1ST EDITION, 550 COPIES.—*Price 15 annas.*]



CORRIGENDA.

In Aph. 71, read "because of its proving too much;" and so throughout the section, where the term so rendered recurs.

In page 36, l. 19, delete the "that," and also the clause "As, by the".

THE
APHORISMS OF THE NYÁYA.
BOOK II.
INTRODUCTION.

a. I devote myself to the brilliant Second Book of the Nyáya, [and I worship] Hari, with [his four] arms tried in contests, [and —if you apply my remarks to the Institute itself, which suggested this comparison,] with its [four] Proofs [—the conquerors in all logical contests—] which every one knows.*

b. Now the Proofs, &c. [B. I. §1], that have been defined, having to be submitted to ordeal [with the view of determining the pertinency of the several definitions], since there is no room for trial without [there be] *Doubt*, in the first place *Doubt* itself must be put on trial.†

* प्रमाणैः प्रथितैर्दोर्भिर्विवादेषु परीक्षितैः । हरिं द्वितीयमध्यायं भासमानमहं भजे ॥

† अथ प्रमाणादिषु लक्षितेषु परीक्षणीयेषु संशयं विना परीक्षाया असम्भवाद्दोर् संशय एव परीक्षणीयः ॥

A

c. Some say that the purpose of the [Second] Book is only the trial of the *Proofs* [—the first in Gautama's enumeration of topics—], because [—they argue—] this is in accordance with the pupil's desire of knowledge [—he wishing to know first the whole truth respecting what is enunciated first—], and according to the rule of the needle and the frying-pan [—the smith, to whom the two are brought simultaneously for repair, polishing off the simpler first—], and since thus the trial of [the definition of] Doubt is subservient to the trial of the Proofs, &c.*

d. But in reality, since [the definition of] Fraud *has* been put on trial [in Book I. §§55—57], and since 'That which is the object of right notion' [—the second in Gautama's list of topics—] is to be put on trial in the Third and Fourth Books, and Futility in the Fifth, the purpose of the [present] Book is the examination of such of the topics as are *other* than these;—for [although Motive, &c., is not examined expressly, yet] the examination of Motive, &c., also will be made here by *substitution*† [—i. e. by saying—as in Aph. 7—“Now substitute Motive for Proof, and the same rule will apply”].

e. Here the aim of the first Diurnal Portion [or half of Book Second] is the examination of just such topics as aforesaid, exclusive of the examination of Proof with reference to the *divi-*

* शिष्यजिज्ञासानुसारात् सूचीकटाह्न्यायाच्चातः संशय-
परीक्षायाः प्रमाणादिपरीक्षोपयोगित्वात् प्रमाणपरीक्षैवा-
ध्यायार्थ इति वदन्ति ॥

† वस्तुतस्तु च्छलस्य परीक्षितत्वात् तृतीयचतुर्थयोः प्रमे-
यस्य पञ्चमे जातेः परीक्ष्यमाणत्वात्तदतिरिक्त्यावत्पदार्थ-
परीक्षैवाध्यायार्थः प्रयोजनादिपरीक्षाया अप्यत्रैवातिदेशेन
करिष्यमाणत्वात् ॥

sion thereof* [—Proof itself being put on trial, with other things, in the first Diurnal Portion, and the question of the propriety of its fourfold division being remitted to the second].

f. Among these, for the trial of [the pertinency of the definition of] Doubt [assigned in B. I. §23], there is an Aphorism stating the *primâ facie* view† [as follows]—

THE FIRST DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION I.

THE ACCOUNT GIVEN OF DOUBT EXAMINED.

समानानेकधर्माध्यवसायादन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाद्वा न
संशयः ॥ १ ॥

The assigned origin of Doubt. Aph. 1.—Doubt does not arise—[perhaps some one will say—] from the consideration of characters common [to more than one] or several [such as cannot really belong to one and the same thing], nor [again] from the consideration of [mutually exclusive] characters under the aspect of an alternative.

a. Some explain the intention of the maker of the aphorism to be as follows,—that here, for fear of a *regressus in infinitum*, Doubt is not an element in the examination of [the pertinency of the definition of] Doubt, because *no* doubt is entertained by the maker of the aphorisms. But this [account of the import of the aphorism] is not correct, for it is not the [definition

* तत्र विभागसापेक्षप्रमाणपरीक्षातिरिक्तोक्त्यावत्पदार्थपरीक्षा प्रथमाङ्गिकार्थः ॥

† तत्र संशयपरीक्षणाय पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ॥

of] the *nature* of Doubt that is put on trial, from which there would be a *regressus in infinitum* [—whereas Doubt is the primordial source of *all* enquiry—] but it is the *cause* of Doubt, as set forth in the aphorism defining it [B. I. §23]:—and thus the doubt—“is Doubt produced from the beholding of similar characters, &c., or not?”—is quite feasible.*

b. But, since there belongs to the maker of the aphorisms certainty [in respect of everything that is set forth in his institute], Doubt is not exhibited with a view merely to the refutation of *primâ facie* views, [—as if these had ever had any weight with the author,—but for the purpose of explaining what are the *sources* of doubt in the minds of other men;—] and so too in the examination of [the pertinency of the definitions of] Proof, &c. It is this that is declared in the *Bhāshya* where it is said—“In an institute, and in discussion [between a teacher and a pupil,—see Book I. § 41] there is no Doubt.” Such is the fact.†

c. Doubt does not arise [—says the supposed objector in the aphorism—] from the beholding of ‘characters common,’ &c., because these [two alleged causes of Doubt] severally wander

* अत्र सूत्रकृता संशयस्यादर्शनात्संशयपरीक्षायां संशयो नाङ्गमनवस्थाभयादित्याशयं सूत्रकृतो वर्णयन्ति । तदसत् । न ह्यत्र संशयस्वरूपं परीक्ष्यते येनानवस्था स्यात् अपितु लक्षणसूत्रोक्तं संशयकारणं । तथाच संशयः समानधर्मदर्शनादिजन्यो नवेति संशयः सम्भवत्येव ॥

† परन्तु सूत्रकृतो निर्णयसत्त्वात् पूर्वपक्षनिरासमात्रस्यापेक्षणात् संशयो न दर्शित एवमेव प्रमाणादिपरीक्षायामपि । तदेवाभिहितं भाष्ये शास्त्रे वादेच विमर्शवर्जमिति तत्त्वम् ॥

away [—so that if the first be present, when there is Doubt, the other is absent, and if the other be present, the first is absent; and how can that be the *cause* of a given phenomenon, which is *absent* when the phenomenon presents itself?] Moreover, Doubt does not arise from the beholding of these [two] combined under the relation of an alternative. For, when taking cognizance that “This [object] has the same character as a post,” or “This has the same character as a man,” one does not *doubt* whether it be a post or not,—because, since resemblance *implies* difference, it is quite competent to one to apprehend the difference [—and not to doubt whether the object be the one or the other —] so soon as one takes cognizance of its possessing the character of something different from it.* [In short, when we say “This is *like* a post,” it is implied that it is *not* a post, but e. g., a man; and again, when we say “This is *like* a man,” it is implied that it is *not* a man, but, e. g., a post;—things not being said to be “like” *themselves*, but only “like” to something *other* than themselves].

d. [Having enunciated an objection to two out of the five causes of Doubt assigned in B. I. § 23,] he objects to the three [remaining alleged kinds of] Doubts arising from ‘conflict of opinion,’ &c.†

* समानादिधर्मदर्शनान्न संशयः प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारात् ।
अन्यतरत्वेनानुगतीकृततद्दर्शनादपि न संशयः । न हि
स्थाणुधर्मसमानधर्मायं पुरुषधर्मसमानधर्मायमिति वा
जानन् स्थाणुर्नवेति सन्दिग्धे समानत्वस्य भेदगर्भत्वाद्भिन्न-
धर्मत्वेन ज्ञाते तद्भेदग्रहस्यैव सम्भवात् ॥

† विप्रतिपत्त्यादिजन्यसंशयत्रयं प्रतिक्षिपति ॥

विप्रतिपत्त्यवस्थायाश्च ॥ २ ॥

The objection further.

Aph. 2.—Nor [—perhaps some one will say— does Doubt arise] from conflict of opinion, nor from unsteadiness [in the recognition of criteria as present or absent].

a. 'Nor does Doubt arise,'—so much is to be supplied* [from §1].

b. The meaning is, that the production of Doubt does not depend upon 'conflicting opinion,' or 'unsteadiness' in the recognition [of some mark which, if we could make sure of it, would determine the object to be so and so], or unsteadiness in the non-recognition [of some mark which, were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be *not* so and so], because these severally wander away, [and every one of them in turn may be absent while Doubt is present].†

c. There is another aphorism to convey an objection to Doubt as the result, exclusively of other causes, of 'conflict of opinion'.‡

विप्रतिपत्तौच सम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥ ३ ॥

The objection further.

Aph. 3.—And [the origin of Doubt is not to be found—some one may say—] in 'conflict of opinion,' because there is [in the minds of the disputants and the hearers, *no* Doubt, but rather dogged] conviction.

* न संशय इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

† विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यवस्थाया अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थायाश्च न संशयजनकत्वं प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ विप्रतिपत्तिजसंशयमात्रप्रतिक्षेपाय सूत्रान्तरम् ॥

a. The import is,—that the cause of Doubt is not to be found in the ‘conflict of opinion,’ because there is *no* conflict of opinion ;—there is *assurance*,—assurance both in the case of the two disputants and of the umpire :—and since assurance *is*, there is no room for Doubt.*

b. Here follows an aphorism intended to demur to the two kinds of Doubt—from (1) unsteadiness in regard to recognition, and (2) in regard to non-recognition† [B. I. § 23].

अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वाच्चाव्यवस्थायाः ॥ ४ ॥

The objection further. *Aph. 4.*—And [—some one may say—Doubt is not the result] of ‘unsteadiness,’ because in ‘unsteadiness’ itself there is steadiness, [—just as, when you are really mistaken, there is no *mistake* about your mistake].

a. The power of generating Doubt might then belong to ‘unsteadiness in recognition’ and to ‘unsteadiness in non-recognition,’ if there were unsteadiness also in [that unsteadiness,] itself, [for there can be nothing in the product that did not pre-exist in the cause ;] but this is not the case ; and so how can that [unsteadiness] which is steady in respect of itself, have the character of unsteadiness in respect of something else ? Such is the meaning ‡

* विप्रतिपत्तौ न संशयहेतुत्वं सम्प्रतिपत्तेः । निश्चयात् ।
वादिनोर्मध्यस्थस्य च निश्चयसत्त्वात् । सति च निश्चये संशया-
योगादिति भावः ॥

† उपलब्धनुपलब्धव्यवस्थातः संशयद्वयनिरासाय सू-
त्रम् ॥

‡ उपलब्धव्यवस्थाया अनुपलब्धव्यवस्थायाश्च संशय-

b. He states another objection.*

तथात्यन्तसंशयस्तद्वर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः ॥ ५ ॥

Further objection.

Aph. 5.—[And some one may perhaps say that Doubt cannot arise from ‘unsteadiness,’] because, if so, there would be endless Doubt, because of the suitableness of its producer to be continual.

a. ‘If so,’—i. e., if it were so,—if ‘unsteadiness’ [in the recognising of criteria,] were the cause [of Doubt]. Some say that this expression ‘if so’ does not belong to the aphorism, but is a part of the *Bhāshya*† [incorporated with the aphorism by mistake].

b. ‘Endless doubt,’—i. e. there would be no cessation of doubt,—‘because of the suitableness to be continual,’—i. e., because of the continual possibility,—‘of its producer,’—i. e., of its generator,—viz., the beholding of cognizability and other characters common‡ [to *all* things whatsoever].

c. He states the tenet§ [of the Nyāya system, in regard to this question].

जनकत्वं तदा स्यात् यदि स्वस्मिन्नप्यव्यवस्थितत्वं स्यात् ।
नत्वेवं तथाच स्वात्मनि व्यवस्थितायास्तस्याः कथमन्यत्रा-
व्यवस्थात्वमित्यर्थः ॥

* दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

† तथा तथा सति । अव्यवस्थाया हेतुत्वे सति । तथा-
शब्दो ऽयं न सूत्रान्तर्गतोऽपितु भाष्यस्य इत्यन्ये ॥

‡ अत्यन्तसंशयः संशयानुच्छेदः स्यात् । तद्वर्मस्य तज्जन-
कस्य ज्ञानत्वादिसाधारणधर्मदर्शनस्य सातत्योपपत्तेः सर्वदा
सम्भवाद् ॥

§ सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

यथोक्ताध्यवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेक्षासंशये नासंशयो
नात्यन्तसंशयो वा ॥ ६ ॥

*The fact as regards
Doubt.*

Aph. 6.—Just from consideration as aforesaid,—from one's not discerning the differences of this or that,—there being Doubt, neither is there *no* Doubt, nor is there endless Doubt.

a. 'From consideration as aforesaid,'—i. e., from the beholding of common characters, &c.;—'of this or that,'—i. e., of the fact of being a man or something else;—'the differences,'—i. e., the character which distinguishes a thing from other things;—the 'discerning', or beholding, of that being absent [—such is the analysis of the word *apekshá* here]; from that non-discerning of the differences, [Doubt arises;] such is the meaning.*

b. And so, since it is agreed that Doubt may arise from such sources as the recognition of characters common [to several things] accompanied by the non-recognition of any differences, it is neither the case that there is *no* Doubt, because [forsooth—as has been contended in §1—4—] there is *no* cause of it,—nor that there is *endless* Doubt, because [forsooth—as pretended in *Aph. 5*—] anything whatever may be the cause of it;—such is the meaning.†

c. And, since the recognition, for example, of characters common [to different things] may produce some separate instance

* यथोक्ताध्यवसायात् साधारणादिधर्मदर्शनात् तस्य पुरुषत्वादेर्यो विशेष इतरव्यावर्तको धर्मस्तस्यापगत ईक्ष ईक्षणं ततः विशेषादर्शनादित्यर्थः ॥

† तथाच विशेषादर्शनसहितसाधारणधर्मदर्शनादितः संशये स्वीकृते न कारणाभावादसंशयो नवा यत्किञ्चित्कारणसत्त्वादत्यन्तसंशय इत्यर्थः ॥

of Doubt, there is no harm though this *should* [—as alleged by the objectors—] wander away [and not be found in every instance present] as regards Doubt *simpliciter* ;* [—there being nothing absurd in a “Plurality of causes”. A man may die of a gunshot wound, though we do not find a gunshot wound wherever we find death].

d. And [Doubt *may* arise] in a ‘conflict of opinions,’ because we understand the doubt, raised by the speeches of the disputants, to belong only to the umpire.†

e. And as for your saying [at § 1.—] “How can Doubt arise from the recognising of characters common [to different things], seeing that *likeness* implies differences?”—this also is not [a right account of the matter]; for the cause [of Doubt] is not the cognizing this or that as having a character similar [to what something else has], but the perceiving that it has a character which belongs to both [of the things of which we doubt whether this be the one or the other]; so that there is no such fault [in our definition] as you allege.‡

f. Now, by means of this same examination of [the pertinency of the definition of] Doubt, suggesting by substitution [—see

* साधारणधर्मदर्शनादेश्व संशयविशेषे जनकत्वात् संशयत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति व्यभिचारेऽपि न क्षतिः ॥

† विप्रतिपत्तौ च बादिवाक्याभ्यां मध्यस्थस्यैव संशयोपगमात् ॥

‡ यच्चेत्तं समानधर्मदर्शनात् कथं संशयः समानत्वस्य भेदगर्भत्वादिति तदपि न । न हि समानधर्मत्वेन तज्ज्ञानं हेतुरपितु उभयसद्वचरितधर्मवत्त्वज्ञानं तथेत्युक्तदोषाभावात् ॥

Intro :—d.], the examination of the other topics [enunciated by Gautama in his opening aphorism], he says* :—

यत्र संशयस्तत्रैवमुत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः ॥ ७ ॥

The same rule to be applied throughout.

Aph. 7.—Where there is [room for] Doubt, *thus* you are to deal in respect of each [case of it] in succession.

a. ‘Thus,’—i. e., in the manner aforesaid;—‘in respect of each in succession,’—i. e., in respect of the [several] applications [of the present rule to the matters to which it is applicable], ‘you are to deal with,’ i. e., you are particularly to meddle with,—i. e., you are thus to understand the relation of examination† [to the definition of this or that, the pertinency of which may call for examination].

b. What, then,—is *Motive* also to be put on trial? He replies—nay,—‘when there is [room for] Doubt,’ [and here there is none]. If there *were* any doubt as to the definition of that, then that also would be put on trial,‡ [—but this is not the case].

c. Or [—to give another explanation of one portion of the aphorism—] the meaning may be, that, *dialogwise*, i. e., in the form of speech and reply, you are to deal with each, i. e.,

* सम्प्रति संशयपरीक्षयैव परेषां पदार्थानां परीक्षाम-
तिदिशन्नाह ॥

† एवमुक्त्तरीत्या उत्तरोत्तरेषु प्रयोगेषु प्रसङ्गः प्रकृतः
सङ्गः परीक्षायाः सम्बन्धो बोद्धव्यः ॥

‡ तत्किं प्रयोजनमपि परीक्षणीयं। नेत्याह। यत्र संशय
इति यदि तद्वृत्त्यर्थसंशयस्तदा तदपि परीक्षणीयम् ॥

you are to make, in respect of the thing doubted, the examination which [ought to be made] in respect of it.*

d. Here ends the section on the examination of Doubt.†

SECTION II.

THE EXAMINATION OF PROOF IN GENERAL.

e. Now, since there is room for it, he states a *primâ facie* view, in order to the examination of Proof in general‡.

प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः ॥ ८ ॥

A denial that Sense, &c., are Proofs.

Aph. 8.—[Perhaps some one will say] the nature of a Proof does not belong to Sense, &c., for it cannot be so at any of the three times [into which Time is divided].

a. That is to say,—the nature of Proof does not belong to Sense, &c., because it cannot be said that, even at any of the three times [past, present, or future], is ‘correct knowledge’ (*pramā*) established by [that to which the Nyāya gives the name of Proof—or] ‘the instrumental cause of correct knowledge’ (*pramāna*)§.

* अथवा उत्तरोत्तरं उक्तिप्रत्युक्तिरूपं तत्प्रसङ्गः तत्र या परीक्षा संशयिते ऽर्थे कर्त्तव्येत्यर्थः ॥

† समाप्तं संशयपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ इदानीमवसरतः प्रमाणसामान्यपरीक्षणाय पूर्वपक्ष-यति ॥

§ कालत्रयेऽपि प्रमाणात्प्रमायाः सिद्धेर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् प्रत्यक्षादीनां न प्रामाण्यमित्यर्थः ॥

b. By a triad of aphorisms he explains how it cannot be so at any one of the three times.*

पूर्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धौ नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्ष-
सिद्धिः ॥ ९ ॥

The anteriority of Proof to knowledge denied.

Aph. 9.—For, if Proof existed anteriorly, Perception could not “arise from the contact of a Sense with its object.”

a. The anteriority, in the first place, of Proof [to the knowledge which, you allege, results from it,] cannot be; ‘for,’ i. e., because,—‘if Proof existed anteriorly to knowledge,’ i. e., if Proof were an existing thing,—it would not be the case [as asserted in B. I. §4] that “Perception takes place from the contact of the Sense with the object,”—because [—on the hypothesis—] the Proof existed *anteriorly* to the Sense-knowledge. For, what is meant by being a ‘Proof’ is the being the instrumental cause of right knowledge,—and, anteriorly to our getting the right knowledge, how, moreover, can anything be called the *cause* of the right knowledge [which we have not even got]? If its existence even anteriorly to the right knowledge must be acquiesced in, how is it “from the contact of the Sense with the object”?—[how is] the production of Perception—the production of Perception, &c.,—from contact of the Sense with the object, &c.,?† [—an

* त्रिसूत्र्या त्रैकाल्यासिद्धत्वं व्युत्पादयति ॥

† प्रमाणस्य पूर्वत्वं तावन्न सम्भवति हि यतः प्रमायाः पूर्वं प्रमाणसिद्धौ प्रमाणसत्त्वे इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्षं सिद्धतीति न स्यात् प्रत्यक्षप्रमातः पूर्वमेव प्रमाणस्य सत्त्वात् । प्रमाणत्वं हि प्रमाकरणत्वं । पूर्वं प्रमाया अलाभे प्रमाकरणत्वमपि कथं स्यात् । पूर्वमेव प्रमायाः सिद्धिरूपे-

account of the matter apparently inconsistent with the anterior existence of the thing so spoken of].

पश्चात् सिद्धौ न प्रमाणेभ्यः प्रमेयसिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥

The posteriority of Proof to knowledge denied.

Aph. 10.—If the existence [of the alleged instruments of right knowledge] were subsequently, then the objects of knowledge would not be known through the instruments of knowledge.

a. If the existence of Proof were [not anterior but] subsequent to right knowledge, the fact of a thing's being rightly known would be settled anteriorly to the Proof,—so that the production of right knowledge, and the cognizance of a thing rightly known, would not come from [what you call] 'the instruments of right knowledge'.

युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावे
बुद्धीनाम् ॥ ११ ॥

The simultaneousness of Proof and knowledge denied.

Aph. 11.—If the existence [of Proof] were simultaneous [with that of the corresponding knowledge], there would not be, in the cognitions, [—e. g., in the case of inference—] that order of succession which results from their being conversant about separate objects.

a. If Proof and the knowledge 'were simultaneous,'—were to arise simultaneously,—there would not be that 'order of suc-

येति कथमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादितः प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः प्रत्यक्षा-
द्युत्पत्तिः ॥

* प्रमाणस्य प्रमातः पश्चात् सिद्धौ विषयस्य प्रमेयत्वं प्रमा-
णात्पूर्वमेव सिद्धमिति न प्रमाणतः प्रमाया उत्पत्तिः प्रमे-
यस्य च क्षप्रिरिति ॥

cession' which there really is in consequence of the cognitions' being conversant about separate objects. For, the apperception of a word [e. g.,] has the *sound* for its object, being in the shape of an auricular intuition,—but the verbal knowledge [—the knowledge conveyed by the word—] has the *sense* of the word for its object, being in the shape of something unperceivable [by Sense], and generically different [from the other object];—so that these two cannot be simultaneous, because, since they have the relation of cause and effect [—which the Naiyáyika will not deny that they have—], they can really be in the order of succession*.

He states the tenet† [of the Nyáya, on the point].

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ १२ ॥

*The sceptic's argument
retorted.*

Aph. 12.—[If there be no such thing as Proof,] because [forsooth] nothing can be such at any of the three times, then the objection itself cannot be established.

a. If the establishment of matters rightly known, by means of Proof, is not to be admitted, because [forsooth] there can be no such thing at any of the three times, then, at that rate, thy objection also [to the possibility of Proof] cannot be established;—so that it is a futile objection:—such is the import‡.

* प्रमाणप्रमेययोर्गुणपक्षत्वे युगपदुत्पत्तौ बुद्धीनामर्थ-
विशेषनियतत्वादयत्क्रमवृत्तित्वं तन्न स्यात् । पदज्ञानं हि
शब्दविषयकं श्रावणप्रत्यक्षरूपं शाब्दबोधश्च पदार्थविषयकः
परोक्षरूपो विजातीय इत्यनयोर्न यौगपद्यं सम्भवति कार्य-
कारणभाववत्त्वात् क्रमिकत्वेनैव सिद्धेः ॥

† सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

‡ यदि त्रैकाल्यासिद्ध्या प्रमाणात् प्रमेयसिद्धिर्नोपेयते

b. Again, hostile evidence, moreover, going to the denial of *all* evidence, cannot be admitted; and so how could the denial be substantiated? So he says* [as follows].

सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः ॥ १३ ॥

This shown further.

Aph. 13.—And the denial itself cannot be established, because [by the denial] all evidence is denied.

a. And if a refutative Proof be admitted, how are *all* proofs disproved?—so he says† [as follows].

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रतिषेधः ॥ १४ ॥

And still further.

Aph. 14.—Or if that one have the nature of a Proof, then *all* [Proof] is not excluded.

a. “But then [—the sceptic may rejoin—] according to my way of thinking, there is no use in establishing realities; since the Universe is a void, the relation of Evidence and [consequent] Knowledge is also unreal; and it has been shown that according to *thy* view it is impossible that this [character of being a Proof] should exist in any of the three times [—before the knowledge, with it, or after it—]:” therefore he solves this‡ [as follows].

तदा तद्वीत्या त्वदीयः प्रतिषेधोऽप्यनुपपन्न इति जात्युत्तरमे-
तदिति भावः ॥

* किञ्च सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधकं प्रमाणमपि ना-
भ्युपगन्तव्यं । तथाच कथं प्रतिषेधसिद्धिरित्याह ॥

† यदिच प्रतिषेधकं प्रमाणमुपेयते तदा कथं सर्वप्रमाण-
प्रतिषेध इत्याह ॥

‡ ननु मन्मते वस्तुसिद्धिर्नापेक्षिता विश्वस्य शून्यत्वात् प्रमा-
णप्रमेयभावोऽपि न वास्तविकस्त्वन्मते च त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिरुक्तै-
वेत्यतस्तदुद्धरति ॥

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्च शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

The antecedent existence of Proof illustrated.

Aph. 15.—And this [fact, that there may be things entitled to the name of Proof] is *not* to be denied as regards all the three times, because, as [the antecedent existence of] a drum is proved by the sound, so is this proved.

a. The denial that this [character of a Proof] could belong to a thing during any of the three times, was asserted [by the sceptic, at §8];—but this [denial] is not competent;—Why?—so he replies, ‘by the sound,’ &c. As an antecedently existent musical instrument, a drum or the like, is proved, or known, [to exist,] by the sound which takes place subsequently [to the formation of the instrument]; or as, from the antecedently existent sun, the chronologically subsequent illumination of things [may be inferred]; or as the existence of fire follows from the smoke which is synchronous with the fire; so here also, from ‘right knowledge,’ which is, in every instance, posterior to the ‘cause of right knowledge,’ is really [demonstrated] the prior existence of a ‘cause of right knowledge,’ such as Sight or the like*.

b. It is not to be supposed, however, that this [—Proof—] has antecedently got the ‘right knowledge’ *associated* with it; for a thing may be entitled to the character of a Proof merely through its association, *from time to time*, with ‘right knowledge,’; just

* त्रैकाल्यप्रतिषेध उक्तः । स न सम्भवति । कुत इत्यत आह शब्दादिति । यथा शब्दात् पश्चाद्भाविनः पूर्वसिद्धस्यातोद्यस्य मुरजादेः सिद्धिर्ज्ञप्तिर्यथा वा पूर्वसिद्धात् सूर्यादुत्तरकालीनवस्तुप्रकाशनं यथा वा वह्निसमकालीनाद्भूमाद्वह्निसिद्धिस्तथात्रापि प्रमातः सर्वत्र प्रमाणादुत्तरभाविन्या एव प्रमाणस्य चक्षुरादेः पूर्वभावित्वमस्येव ॥

as, for example, one may [without inaccuracy] say, "Bring the cook," [—giving to some man, though perhaps not cooking at the time, that name—] just because of his being from time to time engaged in the act of cooking:—such in the import.*

c. In the *Tattwáloka* it is here asserted that that [portion of the aphorism] which ends with *cha* does not belong to the aphorism; but, in reality, from the tenour of his own comment, among the rest, [it is clear that] it *does* belong to the aphorism.†

d. But then [—some one may say—] the dealing with 'Proof' and 'Object of right knowledge,' just since this [relation] is not a fixed thing, is not an absolutely correct procedure; just as, in the case of a rope, the dealing with it [—under a mistaken impression—] as if it were a serpent, for instance:—so, in regard to this doubt, he says‡:—

प्रमेयताच तुलाप्रामाण्यवत् ॥ १६ ॥

Proofs, by being objects of knowledge, are not debarred from being causes of knowledge.

Aph. 16.—And the fact of being an object of right knowledge [does not destroy the character of a proof], as the judicial character of a balance [is not disproved by the fact that you can weigh the balance itself in another pair of scales].

* पूर्वं प्रमावैशिष्यन्तु तस्य नोपेयते । यदाकदाचित् प्रमासम्बन्धेनैव प्रमाणत्वसम्भवाद्यदाकदाचित् पाकसम्बन्धेनैव पाचकमानयेत्यादिवदिति भावः ॥

† अत्र चकारान्तं न सूत्रान्तर्गतमिति तत्त्वलोके । वस्तुतस्तुष्टोकादिस्वरसात् सूत्रान्तर्गतमेव ॥

‡ नन्वनियतत्वादेव प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारो न पारमार्थिको रज्जौ सर्पादिव्यवहारवदित्याशङ्कयामाह ॥

a. As a balance is dealt with as an 'instrumental cause of right knowledge,' because it is what decides the weight of gold, or the like,—and is dealt with as an *object* of knowledge when we decide, by means of another balance, the amount of its own weight;—so also, by reason of the entrance of two causes [for our taking two separate views of the same thing], the Senses &c. are dealt with both as causes of knowledge and as objects of knowledge*.

b. Here is an aphorism, with a *primâ facie* view, intended to oppose [the possibility of any thing's being a Proof], on the ground of the *regressus in infinitum*.†

प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः ॥ १७ ॥

Another sceptical objection to Proof.

Aph. 17.—Since it is by Proofs that the existence of Proofs is established, the existence of *other* Proofs presents itself [for demonstration].

a. Since it is agreed that it is by Proof that the Proofs are established [as being Proofs], you must agree that there are other Proofs [in addition to any number that can be assigned]. To explain;—a Proof, in the first place, is not self-established, for then we should have a case of a thing's supporting *itself*, [—and, as remarked elsewhere, a man—"however clever"—cannot sit upon his own shoulder, and thus convey himself dry-shod across a river,—] therefore another Proof must be admitted;—and since these two, if they were to be the establishers mutually of one

* यथाहि तुलायाः सुवर्णादिगुरुत्वपरिच्छेदकत्वात् प्रमाणव्यवहारस्तुलान्तरेण च तदोयगुरुत्वेयत्तापरिच्छेदे च प्रमेयव्यवहारस्तथा निमित्तद्वयसमावेशादिन्द्रियादेरपि प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहार इति ॥

† अनवस्थया प्रत्यवस्थानपरं पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ।

another, would present a case of reasoning in a circle [—or, literally, of ‘resting on one another mutually,’—as when two boats, by laying hold of one another, vainly expect to avoid being drifted out to sea], therefore there also *another* Proof [of the Proof of the Proof] must be admitted,—and so on without coming to any stand-still :—such is the import.*

b. But then [—the sceptic may rejoin—] a Proof may be established, as such, *without* a Proof :—so he states this† [objection in the following aphorism].

तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १८ ॥

If Proof need no cause, may
not knowledge need no cause?

Aph. 18.—Or in the absence thereof, [—i. e., of Proof,—since Proof may, in virtue of itself, *be* Proof,] then, just as Proof is established [independently], so may this [—viz., right knowledge, independently of any cause of it,] be established.

a. And if ‘in the absence’ of Proof,—i. e., without Proof,—it be agreed that Proof *is*,—then, just in the same way let it be agreed that *that* [—viz., ‘right knowledge’—] may exist. What is the use of acknowledging a *cause* of right knowledge? And thus the whole world is an unsettled question, so that we end in the void [of absolute scepticism] :—such is the import.‡

* प्रमाणानां प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः स्वीकारे प्रमाणान्तरस्वीकारः स्यात् । तथाहि प्रमाणस्य तावन्न स्वतस्सिद्धिरात्माश्रयापत्तेरतः प्रमाणान्तरं स्वीकार्यं । तयोश्च परस्परसाधकत्वे न्योन्याश्रयापत्तिरतस्तत्रापि प्रमाणान्तरमङ्गीकार्यमित्येवमनवस्थेति भावः ॥

† ननु प्रमाणसिद्धिः प्रमाणं विनैव स्यादित्यत्राह ॥

‡ यदिच प्रमाणविनिवृत्तितः प्रमाणव्यतिरेकात् प्रमाण-

b. He states the tenet* [of the Nyāya system, on this point].

न प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १९ ॥

Proof illuminates without requiring to be illuminated.

Aph. 19.—It is not so [—that an endless series of Proofs of Proofs are required—], because it [viz., Proof,] really is, just as the light of a lamp is.

a. For, as, by the light of a lamp, a jar, or the like, is illuminated, so are the 'causes of right knowledge' the illuminators of what things are rightly known. Otherwise, then even the lamp would not be the illuminator of the jar, for fear [forsooth] of the regressus in infinitum,—viz., that the lamp is [in the first place,] the illuminator [or revealer] of the jar, and the Sight [in the second place,] is the revealer of the lamp,—and something else makes us aware of *it*, and so on.†

b. Here ends the section regarding the examination of Proof in general.‡

सिद्धिः स्वीक्रियते तदा तद्वदेव तत्सिद्धिः स्वीक्रियतां किं प्रमाणाङ्गीकारेण । तथाचाव्यवस्थितमेव जगत् स्यादिति शून्यतायां पर्यवसानमिति भावः ॥

* सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† यथाहि प्रदीपालोकाद्घटादिप्रकाशस्तथा प्रमाणानां प्रमेयप्रकाशकत्वमन्यथा प्रदीपस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वं प्रदीप-प्रकाशकं चक्षुस्तज्ज्ञापकमन्यदित्यनवस्थाभयात् प्रदीपो ऽपि न घटप्रकाशकः स्यात् ॥

‡ समाप्तं प्रमाणसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

SECTION III.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF SENSE.

c. After the examination of Proof in general, the separate *kinds* of Proof having to be examined, the one first enumerated, viz., Sense, falls to be [first] examined. And, in respect of this one, the definition given before [—at B. I. §4—] was through its *fruit* [and not in respect of *itself*]:—so one objects to that definition of the fruit, as laid down.*

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिरसमग्रवचनात् ॥ २० ॥

Objection to the definition of Perception.

Aph. 20.—The definition of Perception [—says the Bauddha—] is untenable, because not of the whole [that ought to have been stated] is there a statement.

a. That which has been given as the definition of Perception,—viz., its being what results from the conjunction of a Sense with its object,—is untenable, ‘because it does not state the whole.’ The meaning is this:—of [the species of knowledge called] Perception, a definition, made up of its *cause* [—viz., the conjunction of a Sense with its object,—] has been laid down: in this case the insertion [in the definition,] of the totality made up of the assemblage of causes would prevent the undue extension [of the definition, to things not intended by it], and this [enumeration of the whole assemblage of causes] has *not* been set down. For, ‘not the whole’—i. e., only the fact of being produced by the conjunction of a Sense with its object, is set down [in the definition];—but the conjunction of Soul with

* प्रमाणसामान्यपरीक्षानन्तरं प्रमाणविशेषेषु परीक्षणीयेषु प्रथमोद्दिष्टं प्रत्यक्षं परीक्षणीयं। तत्रच फलद्वारकमेवलक्षणं पूर्वमुक्तमतः फललक्षणं यथाश्रुतमाक्षिपति ॥

Mind, [and of the Senses with the Mind,] and so on, has *not* been set down ;—and so it [—the definition of Sense—] extends unduly to Inference &c., seeing that these [also] result from the conjunction of a Sense-organ [—viz., the Mind—] and an Object [—viz., the Soul—] in the shape of that conjunction of Soul and Mind [—which is the ‘non-intimate cause’ of all knowledge whatsoever]:—such is the meaning.*

b. But then, since there may be a doubt that the conjunction of Soul with Mind is not really a cause [of Perception,—in which case the foregoing objection of the sceptic would go for nothing], he [the sceptic,] says† [as follows].

नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः ॥ २१ ॥

An indispensable to Perception.

Aph. 21.—There is no Perception produced in the absence of the conjunction of the Soul with the Mind.

a. The conjunction, which takes place with the Mind, of Soul divided off [from the universal Soul] by a body,—in the absence of that [conjunction] since there is no Perception produced,—therefore [—says the sceptic—on the Naiyāyika’s own principles—] it

* प्रत्यक्षस्य यल्लक्षणमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नत्वं तन्नेाप-
पद्यतेऽसमग्रवचनात् । अयमर्थः । प्रत्यक्षस्य कारणघटितं
लक्षणमभिहितं । तत्र कारणकलापघटितायाः सामग्र्या
विनिवेशनमतिव्याप्तिनिरासकं तच्च नाभिहितं । असमग्रं
इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यत्वमात्रं ह्यभिहितं । आत्ममनस्संयो-
गादिकन्तु नाभिहितं । तथाचात्ममनस्संयोगरूपेन्द्रियार्थ-
संयोगजन्यतयानुमित्यादावतिव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वात्ममनोयोगादेः कारणत्वमेव नास्तीत्याशङ्काया-
माह ॥

is indispensable that the conjunction of Soul and Mind should be one [element in the] cause of Perception [—and so it ought to have been recorded in the definition]. ‘The production of *Perception*’ is what is here specified; but it is the production of [right] knowledge [in *any* shape] that is meant* [to be impugned by the sceptic].

b. But then [—some one may object to the sceptic—if the definition is bound to specify everything which is a condition of the production of Perception, or of knowledge in general, then] *Space* &c. must be causes of it:—so he propounds this doubt† [as follows].

दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः ॥ २२ ॥

Whether Space &c. are causes of Perception.

Aph. 22.—And were it so, then also in the case of Direction, Space, Time, the Ether, &c., we should find this to be the case, [viz., that these should be enumerated among the causes of Perception].

a. Since there really is, in the case of these also, in a manner, the relation of priority and posteriority [—these being necessarily antecedent to any cognition, and therefore to be reckoned among its causes or conditions—], if [you say that] these are inoperative, then the same is the case with the thing in question‡ [—viz., the conjunction of Soul and Mind, which, however, the Naiyáyika cannot regard as inoperative in the matter].

* शरीरावच्छिन्नस्यात्मनो मनसा यः सन्निकर्षस्तदभावे न प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिर्यतो ऽत आत्ममनस्संयोगस्य कारणत्वमावश्यकं । प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिरिति प्रकृतं । ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरिति विवक्षितम् ॥

† नन्वेवं दिगादीनामपि कारणत्वं स्यादित्याशङ्कते ॥

‡ यथाकथञ्चित् पौर्वापर्यस्य तत्रापि सत्त्वात् तेषामन्यथासिद्धिश्चेत् प्रकृतेऽप्येवम् ॥

b. In order to declare the answer in regard to this point, he says* [as follows].

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वादात्मनो नानवरोधः ॥ २३ ॥

*Knowledge im-
plies Soul.*

Aph. 23.—The Soul is *not* excluded [—in our definition of Perception, or any other kind of knowledge—], because knowledge is the Sign thereof.

a. ‘The Soul is not excluded,’—i. e., is not omitted to be taken in as one of the causes. How?—‘because knowledge is the Sign thereof.’ That of which knowledge is the Sign, is so [—i. e., is implied as one of the causes in the production of knowledge, in the shape of Perception or otherwise]; for Knowledge, being a positive product, establishes [the existence of] a subject of inherence,—and this [subject of inherence], in the ultimate resort [—when nothing else remains to which we can assign the character], is Soul alone; and there is no proof that Space and the rest are causes [of knowledge]:—such is the import. And thus it is established, also, by the sense of the terms, that the conjunction of Mind, with Soul, the Intimate Cause, is the non-intimate cause† [of knowledge in general].

b. Since it may be asked why the non-intimate cause [of

* अत्रोत्तरमभिधातुमाह ॥

† आत्मनो नानवरोधो ऽसङ्ग्रहः कारणत्वेनेति न । कुतः । ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वात् । ज्ञानं लिङ्गं यस्य तत् तथा । ज्ञानं हि भावकार्यं समवायिकारणं साधयति । तच्च परिशेषादात्मैव । दिगादीनाञ्च कारणत्वे न मानमिति भावः । इत्थञ्च समवायिकारणस्यात्मनो मनसा संयोगो ऽसमवायिकारणमित्यप्यर्थात् सिद्धम् ॥

knowledge] is not the conjunction of Soul and *Body*, or the like, —therefore he states an argument for the preeminence of the Mind* [among the joint causes with Soul].

तदयौगपद्यलिङ्गत्वान्मनसः ॥ २४ ॥

The function of the Mind in subservience to Soul.

Aph. 24.—The Mind [is not excluded, in our estimate of the causes of knowledge], because that by which we recognise it [—the Mind—in the case of our cognitions—] is the fact that these [cognitions] are not simultaneous.

a. The expression 'is not excluded' is supplied [from the preceding aphorism].†

b. It is indispensable that the Mind also be reckoned one of the causes, because, through the conjunction of the Senses and the Mind, this [Mind] regulates the non-simultaneousness of cognitions [—acting, in short, the part of *Attention*, which is conversant about only one thought at a time—]; and it is not by the conjunction of *Body* with Soul, or the like, that this is regulated :—such is the import. And thus it is fitting that the conjunction of the Soul with the Mind should be the non-intimate cause‡ [of knowledge].

* आत्मशरीरादिसंयोगस्य कुतो नासमवायिकारणत्वमित्यतो मनसः प्राधान्ययुक्तिमाह ॥

† नानवरोध इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

‡ इन्द्रियमनोयोगद्वारा ज्ञानायौगपद्यनियामकत्वान्मनसोऽपि हेतुत्वमावश्यकमिति । शरीरात्मयोगादेश्च न तन्नियामकत्वमिति भावः । इत्थञ्चात्ममनस्संयोगस्यासमवायिकारणत्वं युक्तम् ॥

c. The aphorism conveying the tenet. *

प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वाच्चेन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षस्य पृथग्व-
चनम् ॥ २५ ॥

*Justification of
the definition.*

Aph. 25.—And, because of its being *the* cause of Perception, is there separate mention of the conjunction of the Sense and the Object.

a. 'Because of its being *the* cause of Perception,'—i. e., because of its being a cause peculiar to Perception.†

b. The meaning is as follows. In the aphorism regarding Perception [B. I. §4], the mention of the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is not indeed with the view of mentioning the cause [in all its completeness], in which case the not mentioning the conjunction of Mind with Soul &c. would have been a deficiency ; but it was for the purpose of marking it [by a character peculiar to itself] : and since, in such a case, it is as proper to mention a characteristic consisting of the peculiar cause as one consisting of the whole set [of causes], and since the peculiar cause [in the case of Perception,] is the conjunction of a Sense with its Object, it was mentioned separately. The mention was proper, seeing that it constitutes a characteristic, without reference to such things as the conjunction of the Mind with the Soul, which are causes common‡ [to all kinds of knowledge as well as Perception].

• सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वात् प्रत्यक्षासाधारणकारणत्वात् ॥

‡ अयमर्थः । प्रत्यक्षसूत्रे इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाभिधानं हि न कारणाभिधित्तया येनात्ममनोयोगाद्यनभिधानेन न्यूनत्वं अपितु लक्षणाभिप्रायेण । तत्रच सामग्रीघटितस्येवासा-

c. He mentions another way of settling the dispute.*

सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसाञ्चेन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षनिमित्त-
त्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

*Another defence of the
definition.*

Aph. 26.—And [the conjunction of the
Sense and the Object is the principal pecu-
liarity in Perception,] because the conjunction of a Sense with
its Object is the cause [of knowledge] in the case [even] of those
who are asleep, or whose minds are not attending.

a. 'Of knowledge'—is to be supplied.†

b. The fact that the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is
the main thing [in producing Perception], is proved by the pro-
duction of knowledge, quite instantaneously, in the case [even] of
those sleeping and those whose minds were not attending, by the
conjunction of the organ of Hearing with the thundering of a
cloud, for instance ; or by the conjunction of the organ of Touch
with fire, for example.‡

c. He mentions another argument.§

धारणकारणघटितस्यापि लक्षणस्य सुवचत्वादिन्द्रियार्थसन्नि-
कर्षस्य चासाधारणत्वात् पृथग्वचनं । आत्ममनसंयोगादि-
साधारणकारणाद्यवच्छिद्य लक्षणघटकतया वचनं युक्तम् ॥

* समाध्यन्तरमाह ॥

† ज्ञानस्येति शेषः ॥

‡ सुप्तानां व्यासक्तमनसाञ्च घनगर्जितादिना श्रोत्रस-
न्निकर्षाद्वह्नादिना त्वक्सन्निकर्षाच्च द्रागेव ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरि-
न्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य प्राधान्यम् ॥

§ युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

तस्यापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषाणाम् ॥ २७ ॥

Another reason. *Aph. 27.*—And by these [conjunctions of Sense and object] are excluded the [other] kinds of knowledge.

a. The kinds of knowledge [other than Perception] are ‘excluded,’—i. e., distinguished,—set aside,—by ‘these,’—i. e., the conjunctions of Sense and Object. For the conjunction of Soul and Mind, or the like, does not exclude;—for the fact of being produced thereby is common to the other kinds of knowledge [as well as Perception]. In like manner, the fact also of its resulting from conjunction of a Sense-organ with the *Mind* would not serve as the characteristic, because this would not extend to the mental* [i. e., to internal intuition, in which case the Sense-organ, so called, is the Mind itself;—and the definition of *pratyaksha* must extend to internal as well as external Perception].

b. He ponders a doubt, with reference to whether the conjunction of a Sense and its Object is *not* the cause [of Perception], because this may be present unattended† [by any resultant Perception].

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः ॥ २८ ॥

Sensation unattended by Perception.

Aph. 28.—This is not the cause [of Perception—some one may perhaps say—],

* ज्ञानविशेषाणां तैरिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षैरपदेशो विशेषणं व्यावृत्तिः । आत्ममनोयोगादिकं हि न व्यावर्त्तकं तज्जन्यत्वस्य ज्ञानान्तरसाधारणत्वात् । एवमिन्द्रियमनोयोगजत्वमपि न लक्षणं मानसे व्याप्तेः ॥

† इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षो न हेतुरन्वयव्यभिचारादित्याशयेन शङ्कते

because this [Perception] is debarred [in instances where the conjunction of a Sense with its Object was present].

a. The meaning is, that [some one may perhaps say that] the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is not the cause [of Perception], because, at the time, e. g., of listening to a song, though there really be the conjunction, e. g., of the Sight and a jar, the visual perception of it, e. g., is debarred.*

b. He clears up this doubt.†

नार्थविशेषप्राधान्यात् ॥ २९ ॥

Solution of the puzzle.

Aph. 29.—Nay,—it is from the preeminence of the particular Object.

a. The song, e. g., is heard, because of the engrossingness,—the desire to attend to it, of some particular object, e. g., the song; and because thus the desire of hearing the song is an obstacle, e. g., to [our taking note of] sensations of Sight, and because it is the absence of obstacles that brings about the effect; and the fact of being the cause belongs to the conjunction of a Sense with its Object in cooperation therewith† [—i. e., in cooperation with the absence of obstacles];—therefore the *primâ facie* view [here referred to] is not right.‡

* गीतश्रवणादिकाले चक्षुर्घटसंयोगादौ विद्यमाने ऽपि चाक्षुषादेर्व्याहतत्वं इन्द्रियार्थसंयोगो न हेतुरित्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ अर्थविशेषस्य गीतादेः प्राबल्यात् बुभुक्षितत्वाद् गीतादिश्रवणं । तथाच गीतशुश्रूषादेश्चाक्षुषादिप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य च कार्यार्जकत्वात् तत्सहकारेण चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य हेतुत्वमतः पूर्वपक्षो न युक्त इति ॥

b. But then [the objector, taking another line of objection, may say—] if Perception were a different kind of Evidence [from the others], the investigation of its definition would be fitting,—but it is really no such thing:—which doubt he next ponders.*

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धेः ॥ ३० ॥

Whether Perception be not a case of Inference.

Aph.—30. Perception [some one may say—] is [none other than] Inference, because the apprehension [to which we give the name,] is through the apprehending of a part, [which is to us a Sign of the whole].

a. What we regard as a Perception, e. g., the cognition of a jar, is an 'inference,' i. e., a conclusion;—because we apprehend it after apprehending 'a part,' viz., the part in front; and thus the cognition, e. g., of a tree, is an inference, because it results from the cognition of a Sign—[this Sign] consisting in the apprehension of a part [of the tree]:—such is the meaning.†

b. He clears up this doubt.‡

न प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावदुपलम्भात् ॥ ३१ ॥

Perception not a case of Inference.

Aph. 31.—Nay,—because by Perception is apprehended so much as is so.

* ननु सति प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमाणान्तरत्वे तल्लक्षणस्य परीक्षा सङ्गच्छते तदेव तु नास्तीत्याशङ्कते ॥

† प्रत्यक्षत्वेनाभिमतं घटादिज्ञानमनुमानमनुमितिरेकदेशस्य पुरोभागस्य ग्रहणानन्तरमुपलब्धेस्तथाचैकदेशग्रहणात्मकलिङ्गज्ञानजन्यत्वाद्वृक्षादिज्ञानमनुमितिरित्यर्थः ।

‡ समाधत्ते॥

a. That Perception is Inference is not the case,—that is to say, so far forth as it is a Perception, it is not a Conclusion.*

b. 'Because *so* much is apprehended [through Perception] as is *so*,'—i. e., because, even by *thee* it is admitted that there is [really such an] apprehension; since 'so much as is *so*,'—i. e., *some* portion or other,—is apprehended by Perception,—i. e., by Sense.†

c. It is to be understood, moreover, that this is but low ground —[that we have taken up;—for we might have argued that] Perception simply is not excluded [by your argument to prove its being a case of Inference], because it [—your argument—] does not exclude Sounds, Odours, &c.,‡ [—which are apprehended, by Sense, in their totality,—though the objects of Sight might, at first sight, seem to afford a handle to the objector, by being apprehended through the apprehension of a *part*].

d. He censures, moreover, [as follows,] even the assertion that the cognition of a tree or the like, is a case of Inference.§

नचैकदेशोपलब्धिरवयविसङ्गावात् ॥ ३२ ॥

* प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमिति न । प्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छेदेनानुमितित्वं नेत्यर्थः ॥

† यावत्तावदुपलम्भात् । यावत्तावतो ऽपि यस्य कस्यचिद्भागस्य प्रत्यक्षेणोद्भियेणोपलम्भादुपलम्भस्य त्वयाप्यभ्युपगमात् ॥

‡ इदमुपलक्षणं शब्दगन्धादिप्रत्यक्षस्यावारणात् न प्रत्यक्षमात्रनिषेध इत्यपि बोध्यम् ॥

§ यदपि वृक्षादिज्ञानस्यानुमितित्वमिति तदपि दूषयति ॥

*A thing is perceived, when
a part of it is perceived.*

Aph. 32.—And there is not [—in the case, e. g., of the cognition of a tree, —] the apprehension [merely] of a part,—because that which is made up of the parts [—i. e., the whole—] is a reality.

a. 'And not,'—i. e., neither.*

b. Neither is it proper, moreover, to say that there is the apprehension of a part only [—in the case, e. g., of a tree's being apprehended by vision—],—'because that which is made up of the parts is a reality'—i. e., because what is made up of the parts is [there]; so that, at the time of the perception of the part, the perception of that also which is made up of the parts is not excluded,—inasmuch as there is the conjunction of the Sight with it also [—that which is in conjunction with a part, being, even thereby, in conjunction with that to which the part pertains—]:—such is the import.† [See the *Tarka-sangraha*, §47.]

c. Here ends the Section on the Examination of Perception.‡

SECTION IV.

AS TO WHAT IS MEANT BY A WHOLE.

d. He begins a section on the subject of [a whole, or] 'what is made up of parts' (*avayavin*),—for there is pertinency in his

* नच नवेत्यर्थः ॥

† नचैकदेशस्यैवोपलब्धिरित्यपि युक्तं । अवयविसङ्गा-
वात् । यतोहि अवव्यस्ति अतस्तदवयवप्रत्यक्षकाले ऽवय-
विनोऽपि प्रत्यक्षं न व्याहतं तेनापि सह चक्षुस्संयोगादि-
सत्त्वादिति भावः ॥

‡ समाप्तं प्रत्यक्षपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

analysing this [conception] with a view to establishing the reason [to be no fiction, which was assigned in §32, viz.], 'because what is made up of parts is a reality.'*

साध्यत्वादवयविनि सन्देहः ॥ ३३ ॥

Whether there be any wholes.

Aph. 33.—[Perhaps some one will say] there is a doubt as regards 'what is made up of parts,' because it requires to be proved [that there is anything to which the name of 'a whole' is appropriate].

a. The meaning is this :—there is a doubt in regard to 'what is made up of parts,'—'because it requires to be proved,'—i. e., because that is not a reality ;—that is to say, the reason alleged, viz., 'because what is made up of parts is a reality,' is incompetent because doubtful.†

b. And, as regards this, it is impossible that 'what is made up of parts' should be *one*,—because there may belong to it contradictory characters, in the shape, for instance, of shaking and not shaking, redness and not redness, hiddenness and unhiddenness. To explain:—as far as regards the branches, a shaking, and again, as far as regards the trunk, the absence thereof, is beheld [in a tree] ; and it is impossible that there should exist simultaneously, in one and the same thing, a couple of contradictory characters. Therefore *parts* alone are such [—i. e., are realities—], and not any other thing 'made up of the parts,'—for there is no evidence‡ [in support of the latter].

* अवयविसङ्गावादिति हेतुसाधनायोपोद्धातसङ्गत्यावय-
विप्रकरणमारभते ॥

† अयमर्थः । अवयविनि साध्यत्वादसिद्धत्वात् सन्देहो-
ऽवयविसङ्गावादित्युक्तहेतुः सन्दिग्धासिद्ध इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ तत्रच सकम्पत्वाकम्पत्वरक्तत्वारक्तत्वावृतत्वानावृतत्वा-

c. In like manner is this to be gathered from observing that a cloth, of which a part is reddened by safflower, is not red as regards the ends [which were not dipped into the dye],—and so too from observing that, as far as regards the surface [presented to us], &c., a thing is not hidden [—while it is hidden as regards its other parts]:—such is the *primâ facie* view of the Bauddhas. And here the *primâ facie* aphorisms of the Bauddhas, and the things penned by the author of the *Vártika*, are not written, for fear of prolixity.*

d. The aphorism containing the tenet.†

सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेः ॥ ३४ ॥

Proof that there are wholes. Aph. 34.—Were wholes unreal, everything would be imperceptible.

a. If the whole [‘made up of parts’] were not a reality, all its qualities, actions, &c., would be imperceptible; and thus

दिलक्षणविरुद्धधर्माध्यासादेको ऽवयवी न सम्भवति । तथा-
हि । शाखावच्छेदेन कम्पो मूलावच्छेदेन तदभावो ऽप्युप-
लभ्यते नचैकस्मिन्नेव द्रव्ये एकदैव विरुद्धधर्मद्वयसमावेशः
सम्भवति । तस्मादवयवा एव तथाभूता न त्वन्यो ऽवयवी
मानाभावात् ॥

* एवं महारञ्जनरक्तैकदेशस्यांशुकस्य दशावच्छेदेनारक्त-
त्वोपलम्भादेवं यावत्पृष्ठादेरनावृतत्वोपलम्भादवसेयं । इति
बौद्धानां पूर्वपक्षः । अत्रच बौद्धानां पूर्वपक्षसूत्राणि वार्तिक-
कृता लिखितानिच विस्तरभयान्न लिख्यन्ते ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

even a thing's being shaking or not shaking, red or not red, would not be perceptible,—because these [characters,—according to the objector,—] belong to the Atoms [or absolutely small 'parts' of things], and the [indispensable] condition of perception is bulk,* [—which does not belong to Atoms].

b. He states another reason.†

धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३५ ॥

*Another
proof.*

Aph. 35.—And [there must be 'wholes,'] because holding and pulling are [—only on that supposition—] reasonable.

a. A whole is something other than the parts [of which the whole is made up], because, it being so, the holding and pulling [of masses] involves no absurdity;—while, were it the fact, on the other hand, that only heaps of Atoms exist [—constituting no wholes—], then it would not be the case [—as, however, it is—] that, by holding a part, we hold the whole, and, by pulling a part, we pull the whole :—such is the meaning.‡

b. You must not say this, [—with well-intentioned but misdirected zeal—] that that, “As, by the [‘There are such things

* अवयविनो ऽसिद्धौ तद्गुणकर्मादीनां सर्वेषामग्रहणं
तथाच सकम्पाकम्पत्वरक्तारक्तत्वादिकमपि न सुग्रहं पर-
माणुगतत्वात् प्रत्यक्षे महत्त्वस्य हेतुत्वात् ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ अवयवेभ्यो ऽवयव्यतिरिच्यते तथा सति धारणाकर्षण-
योरुपपत्तेरन्यथा परमाणुपुञ्जत्वे चैकदेशधारणेन सकल-
धारणमेकदेशाकर्षणेन सकलाकर्षणञ्च न स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

as wholes] because then this [pulling, &c.] is reasonable,' as, by the pulling of the boat, the person standing in the boat is pulled,—and as, by the holding of the pitcher, the curds in the pitcher is held ;”—[you must not say this,] because it is altogether in virtue of a peculiar conjunction [—quite different from that of a boat and the person standing in it—] that the relation of parts and whole, or its absence, comes to exist. Therefore, holding that only the previously assigned argument [in §35,] is the proper one, he [the author], pondering the solution in respect of this matter offered by some one else, condemns it* [as follows].

सेनावनादिवदितिचेन्नातीन्द्रियत्वादणूनाम् ॥ ३६ ॥

A plausible argument disowned.

Aph. 36.—If [any one should say] it is like the case of an army, or a forest, [we reply that] it is not so,—because Atoms are supersensual.

a. If [any one says], though a very distant man, or single tree, or the like, is imperceptible, yet, as an army, or a forest, or the like [aggregate of things separately imperceptible], is perceived,—so too, though a single Atom be imperceptible, a collection of them, in the shape of a jar for example, *may* be perceptible,—[we reply, that] this too is not so,—‘because Atoms are supersensual.’ What is meant is this, that, since *bulk* is the [indispensable] condition of Perception, the perception of an army, or a forest, or the like, is fitting [—inasmuch as the constituents of the aggregate have bulk themselves—] ; but not [so is it] in the case of Atoms, because these have *no* bulk.†

* इदमवद्यं नौकाकर्षणेन नौकास्थानकर्षणवत् कुण्डधारणेन कुण्डस्थदधिधारणवच्चोपपत्तेर्विजातीयसंयोगबलेनैवावयवावयविभावाभावे ऽप्युपपत्तेरतः पूर्वाक्तां युक्तिमेव साधीयसीं मन्यमानस्तत्र परोक्तं समाधानमाशङ्क्य दूषयति ॥

† अतिदूरस्थैकमनुष्यैकवृक्षादेरप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि सेनावनादि-

b. Here ends the section on the examination of 'wholes'.*

SECTION V.

THE DEFINITION OF INFERENCE EXAMINED.

c. Since this is the proper place for it, in order to test [the definition of] Inference, whose turn has arrived, he states a *prima facie* view.†

रोधोपघातसादृश्येभ्यो व्यभिचारादनुमानमप्र-
माणम् ॥ ३७ ॥

*The evidence of Infer-
ence impugned.*

Aph. 37.—[Some one may say that] Inference is no Proof, because it wanders away in the case of (1) the embankment, (2) the damage, and (3) the likeness.

a. That Inference is of three kinds, has been stated already [B. I. §5]. If the [whole] three kinds of this be proved not to be the causes of right knowledge, it will be settled, by the sense of the terms, that Inference is no Proof;—in reliance upon which, this‡ [is propounded which is propounded in the aphorism].

प्रत्यक्षवदेकपरमाणोरप्रत्यक्षत्वे ऽपि तत्समूहरूपघटादेः प्र-
त्यक्षं स्यादिति चेन्न तदपि अणूनामतीन्द्रियत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षे
महत्त्वस्य हेतुत्वात् सेनावनादिप्रत्यक्षं युज्यते न त्वणूनां
महत्त्वाभावादिति भावः ॥

* समाप्तमवयविपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

† अवसरेण क्रमप्राप्तमनुमानं परीक्षितुं पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

‡ अनुमानस्य त्रैविध्यं पूर्वमुक्तं । तत्र त्रिविधस्याप्रामाण्ये
साधिते ऽनुमानमप्रमाणमर्थात् सिद्धमित्याशयेनेदम् ।

b. Inference,—admitted to *have* the character of inference,—is no 'Proof',—i. e. no cause of right knowledge,—because of the fact that the reason [assigned in any case of inference] is one that wanders away,* [and presents itself where what it ought to certify is not found to accompany it].

c. Among these three kinds [of Inference, thus all alike impugned,] he exhibits the wandering away [of the Sign from the thing signified] by saying 'through the damming up,' &c.†

d. [According to the objector,] the inference of rain, as tripartitely exemplified,—from the swelling of the river, the carrying off of their eggs by the ants, and the screaming of the peacocks,—cannot be, [—i. e. 'cannot be an absolutely certain means of right knowledge,—] because there may be a disjunction [between the Sign and the thing signified], inasmuch as the swelling of the river may have depended on the damming up of the river,—and the ants' carrying away their eggs may have resulted from their nest's having been damaged,—and the sound like the voice of a peacock may have been uttered by a man.‡

e. He clears up this doubt.§

नैकदेशत्राससादृश्येभ्यो ऽर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ३८ ॥

* अनुमानं अनुमानत्वेनाभिमतं न प्रमाणं प्रमितिकरणं व्यभिचारिहेतुकत्वात् ।

† तत्र त्रिविधे व्यभिचारं दर्शयति रोधेत्यादिना ।

‡ नदीवृद्ध्या पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चारेण मयूररुतेन च वृक्षानुमानं त्रिविधमुदाहरणं न सम्भवति । नदीरोधाधीननदीवृद्ध्या आश्रयोपघाताधीनपिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चारेण मनुष्यकर्तृकमयूररुतसदृशरुतेन व्यभिचारात् ।

§ समाधत्ते ।

*Inference really a means
of right knowledge.*

Aph. 38.—Nay [—it is not to be denied that the recognition of a Sign is a cause of right knowledge—], because that [which we mean by a Sign,] is something else than the part, and the fear, and the likeness, [referred to by the objector].

a. That the recognition of a Sign is not a means of right knowledge is not the case. There is no fault [—in the Signs, the recognition of which we say leads to right knowledge—], because the swelling of the river, and the rest, which *are* Signs, are something other than that swelling of a river which results from the damming up a part of it, and that carrying off of their eggs by the ants which results from fear [—when their nest has been disturbed], and that scream which was [only] *like* the scream of the peacock. And there is not, in *every* instance, the doubt of the wandering away [of the Sign unaccompanied by the thing signified];—and where this [doubt] does occur, since it can be removed by redargution [B. I. §39], there is no fault:—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the examination of Inference.†

SECTION VI.

THE EXAMINATION OF TIME PRESENT.

c. [Perhaps some one will say—] that is not proper, which

* अनुमानाप्रामाण्यं न युक्तमेकदेशरोधजनदीवृद्धेस्त्रा-
सजपिपीलीकाण्डसञ्चारान्मयूररुतसदृशरुताच्च लिङ्गीभूता-
नां नदीवृद्धादीनां भिन्नत्वान्न दोषः। नच सर्वत्र व्यभि-
चारशङ्का। सत्याच्च तस्यान्तर्केण तदपनयनान्न दोष इत्या-
शयः ॥

† समाप्तमनुमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

you imagine, that the recognition of a Sign has reference to the three times [—past, present, and future,—see B. I. §5], because, since there is *no* present,—because there is neither past nor future, the conception of which is dependent on that [—i. e., on the present, which is a nonentity], the receptivities—in the shape of the triad of times—do not exist;—so, with reference to this, commencing a section for the examination of time present, he [—in the character of the objector—] demurs to time present.*

वर्त्तमानाभावः पततः पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्तेः ॥ ३६ ॥

The sceptic denies time present.

Aph. 39.—There is no present time [—says the sceptic—], because, of a thing falling, we can demonstrate [only] the time through which it has fallen and that through which it has to fall.

a. 'There is no present time,'—i. e., there is no kind of time other than past and future. He explains this, saying 'of a thing falling,' &c. Of a thing falling, a fruit for instance, there is the distance fallen, a certain space, the limit of which is the tree; and there is a certain distance to be fallen through, the limit of which is the ground; but there is no concernment also with a *present*:—such is the import.†

* अनुमानस्य त्रिकालविषयत्वमभिमतं तन्न युक्तं वर्त्तमानाभावेन तदधीनज्ञानयोरतीतानागतयोरभावेन कालत्रयात्मकविषयाभावादित्याशयेन वर्त्तमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणमारभमाणो वर्त्तमानमाक्षिपति ।

† वर्त्तमानाभावः अतीतानागतभिन्नकालत्वाभावः । व्युत्पादयति पतत इति । पततः फलादेर्दृष्टावधिकः कश्चन देशः पतिताध्वा भूम्यवधिकः कश्चन पतितव्याध्वा नतु वर्त्तमानस्य प्रसङ्गो ऽप्येति भावः ।

b. He clears up this doubt.*

तयोरप्यभावो वर्त्तमानाभावे तदपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ४० ॥

Proof that there must be time present.

Aph. 40.—Those two also [viz., the past and future] would not be, if the present were not; because they are relative to it.

a. If the present were not, then 'those two,'—the past and the future, would also not be;—'because they are relative to it,'—i. e., because what is meant by being past is the being the counterpart to the destruction of the present; and because what is meant by being future is the being the counterpart to the antecedent non-existence of the present:—such is the import.†

b. But then [the sceptic may rejoin that], since those two are substantiated just by their mutual relation, they have no relation to a [needlessly postulated] present:—therefore he says:‡—

नातीतानागतयोरितरेतरापेक्षासिद्धिः ॥ ४१ ॥

Past and future not immediately related.

Aph. 41.—The past and future are not substantiated by mutual reference.

a. That is to say, because this would be a case of mutual dependency,§ [—or of reasoning in a circle].

* समाधत्ते ।

† वर्त्तमानाभावे तयोरतीतानागतयोरप्यभावः स्यात् तयोस्तदपेक्षत्वात् । वर्त्तमानध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वं ह्यतीतत्वं वर्त्तमानप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वं ह्यनागतत्वमिति भावः ॥

‡ ननु तयोः परस्परापेक्षयैव सिद्धेर्न वर्त्तमानापेक्षेत्यत आह ॥

§ अन्योन्याश्रयत्वादिति भावः ॥

b. What were the loss [—enquires the sceptic—] if these two also [—past time and future—] did not exist? Therefore he states another argument.*

वर्त्तमानाभावे सर्वाग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः ॥ ४२ ॥

Proof that there is a present. Aph.. 42.—Were there no present, there would be no cognition of anything, because perception would be impossible.

a. If there were no present, perception could not take place, because time present is the receptivity of perception. For this reason he [Udayanāchārya] says, “By the sight, &c. is apprehended what is adapted [to the sense], and present [in time].” And if there were no perception, there would be no ‘cognition,’—or knowledge,—of anything; because the other kinds of knowledge have their root in perception:—such is the import.†

b. But then [the sceptic may say], if what is meant by being past is the being the counterpart of the destruction of the present [—see §40, a—], and what is meant by the being future, the being the counterpart of the antecedent non-existence of the present, then, in the case of a jar which exists only in the present, how comes the notion “It *was* black, and [—after baking in the kiln—] it *will be* red?” To this he replies.‡

* तयोरप्यभावे का क्षतिरतो युक्त्यन्तरमाह ।

† वर्त्तमानाभावे प्रत्यक्षं नोपपद्यते प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्त्तमानविषयत्वात् । अत एवाह सम्बद्धं वर्त्तमानञ्च गृह्यते चक्षुरादिनेति । प्रत्यक्षाभावे च सर्वमेव ग्रहणं ज्ञानं न स्यात् प्रत्यक्षमूलकत्वादितरज्ञानानामिति भावः ।

‡ ननु यदि वर्त्तमानध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वमतीतत्वं वर्त्तमान-

कृतताकर्त्तव्यतोपपत्तेरुभयथा ग्रहणम् ॥ ४३ ॥

How a thing present may be spoken of in the past or future tense.

Aph. 43.—It [—the jar—] may be conceived in both ways [—i. e., both as past and future,—] because the facts of having been made and of having to be made, are conceivable [in respect of its past and future qualities].

a. That is to say,—since, of the black and red colours, for example, of a jar or the like, though this exist only in the present, the facts of having been made and of having to be made, i. e., the facts of their being past and future, are conceivable, therefore the jar or the like also may be spoken of as past or future, through its being connected mediately* [—with the past and the future, through its past and future qualities].

b. Here ends the section on the examination of time present.†

SECTION VII.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE PROOF DRAWN FROM LIKENESS.

c. Now, as the occasion presents itself, in order to test [the

प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वञ्च भविष्यत्त्वं तदा वर्त्तमान एव घटे
कथं श्याम आसीद्भूतो भविष्यतीति धीरत आह ॥

* वर्त्तमानस्यापि घटादेः श्यामरक्तरूपादीनां कृतता-
कर्त्तव्यतयोरतीतताभविष्यत्तयोरुपपत्तेर्घटादेरप्यतीतानाग-
तत्वेन व्यवहारः परम्परासम्बन्धादित्यर्थः ॥

† समाप्तं वर्त्तमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

pertinency of the definition of] the 'Proof drawn from Likeness' (*upamāna*), he sets forth a *primâ facie* view, as follows.*

अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः ॥ ४४ ॥

The Proof from likeness objected to.

Aph. 44.—An argument from Likeness is not substantiated either through complete, considerable, or partial similarity.

a. It was stated [at B. I. §6], that [the proof called] Comparison (*upamāna*) arises from a previously known similarity. This [according to the sceptic] is not right, because [as regards the matter in question] similarity will not suit, whether it be complete, considerable, or slight. For, on the ground of complete similarity, it is never argued that "A cow is like a cow;" nor, on the ground of considerable similarity, that "A buffalo is like a cow;" nor, on the ground of there being *some* similarity, that "A mustard-seed is like mount Meru." And the comparative proof drawn from *dissimilarity* is in like manner to be refused admission, because *similarity* implies this in addition.†

b. He clears up this doubt.‡

* अथावसरेण क्रमप्राप्तेऽपमानं परीक्षितुं पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

† प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानमुक्तं । तन्न युक्तं यतः साधर्म्यमात्यन्तिकं प्रायिकमैकदेशिकं वा न सम्भवति । न ह्यात्यन्तिकसाधर्म्येण गौरिव गौरित्युपमानं प्रवर्तते न वा प्रायिकसाधर्म्येण गौरिव महिष इति न च यत्किञ्चित्साधर्म्येण मेरुरिव सर्प इति । साधर्म्यस्येवोपलक्षणत्वाद्वैधर्म्योपमानमप्येवं खण्डनीयम् ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धेर्यथोक्तदोषानुप-
पत्तिः ॥ ४५ ॥

*Reply to the
objection.*

Aph. 45.—Since an argument from Likeness is substantiated through previously known similarity, the aforesaid objection fails.

a. 'Previously known'—[or, as it may be explained, differently from the way in which it is explained under B. I. §6—] that similarity which is known, *in a high degree* [—as likeness to a cow exists, in the *Bos Gavaeus*, in a high degree] as contradistinguished from a buffalo or the like,—since the knowledge of this is the instrumental cause of a 'conclusion from resemblance' (*upamiti*), there is no fault, [such as the sceptic objects to us]. And the similarity consists in this or that [—e. g., shape colour, size, &c., &c.], according as the case may be, &c.*

b. He states, as a doubt, the opinion of the *Vaiśeṣikas* [—apparently, therefore, anterior to himself—] that there is no other kind of Proof, such as the 'argument from resemblance,' since the end is attained by 'Inference,'† [of which this is only a case].

प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ४६ ॥

Kaṇāda's opinion.

Aph. 46.—[The case is not different from ordinary Inference,] because it is [—like any

* प्रसिद्धं प्रकर्षेण महिषादिव्यावृत्त्या सिद्धं ज्ञातं यत् साधर्म्यं तज्ज्ञानस्योपमितिकरणत्वान्न दोषः। साधर्म्यञ्च प्रकरणाद्यनुसारात् किञ्चित्किञ्चिदिति ॥

† अनुमानेन चरितार्थं नोपमानं प्रमाणान्तरमिति वैशेषिकमतमाशङ्कते ॥

other case of Inference—] an establishing of the unperceived by means of the perceived.

a. 'By means of the perceived,'—i. e., by the species of resemblance to a cow,—since there is [nothing else than] an inference of what unperceived [animal] is meant by the word *Bos Gavaeus*,—there is no other proof such as Comparison.*

b. He replies to this.†

नाप्रत्यक्षे गवये प्रमाणार्थमुपमानस्य पश्यामः ॥ ४ ७ ॥

How Comparison differs from Inference.

Aph. 47.—It is not in respect of a *Bos Gavaeus unperceived*—that we see the need of 'the recognition of Likeness' (*upamāna*) as the instrument of right knowledge.

a. That is to say,—it is not in respect of what is 'unperceived,'—i. e., not perceived inasmuch as it is [in relation to us only as] something possessed of a Sign (*vyāpya*)—[which Sign, say, is perceived],—since *that* [we grant you] would be a case of Inference,—that we see 'the need of *this* as the instrument of right knowledge,'—i. e., the subserviency of 'the recognition of Likeness' to right knowledge.‡

b. Or the meaning is,—we do not regard as a case of Inference the object of the evidence called Comparison,—that right knowledge,—viz., the right knowledge due to Comparison,—'in

* प्रत्यक्षेण गोसादृश्यविशेषेण अप्रत्यक्षस्य गवयपदवाच्यत्वस्यानुमितेर्नोपमानं मानान्तरमिति ॥

† अत्रोत्तरयति ॥

‡ अप्रत्यक्षे व्याप्यवत्तया ऽप्रत्यक्षे अनुमानत्वेन प्रमाणार्थं प्रमाप्रयोजनमुपमानस्य न पश्याम इत्यर्थः ॥

respect of the Bos Gavaeus,'—i. e., in respect of what belongs to the Bos Gavaeus,—viz., that 'unperceived thing,'—i. e., the fact of being what is *meant* by the word Bos Gavaeus. The import is, [that this is not a case of Inference,] because there is not the knowledge of 'constant attendedness,'* [—which,—see the *Tarka-sangraha*,—is what constitutes anything a Sign from which alone something else can be said to be *inferred*].

c. But then [it may be objected]—let it be granted that the knowledge of 'constant attendedness' is indispensable [to Inference :—have we not it here also ?]—so, with reference to this, he states another argument.†

तथेत्युपसंहारादुपमानसिद्धेर्नाविशेषः ॥ ४८ ॥

This shown further.

Aph. 48.—It is not the case that it is not different [from Inference], because, through the compendious expression "So," it is settled that there is [a special kind of evidence called] the 'Argument of Likeness'.

a. It is not the case that the 'recognition of Likeness' is not different from the 'recognition of a Sign;'—because, 'through the compendious expression 'So,'—i. e., from the information that "As is a cow, so is a Bos Gavaeus,"—it is settled by the 'Argument of Likeness,'—i. e., the 'conclusion from Likeness' (*upamiti*) is settled, in dependence on the 'Argument of Likeness' (*upamāna*). And in like manner it is settled by conscious-

* अथवा गवये गवयवृत्तौ अप्रत्यक्षे गवयपदवाच्यत्वे उपमानस्य प्रमाणार्थं प्रमां उपमानजन्यां प्रमां अनुमानत्वेन न पश्याम इत्यर्थः । व्याप्तिज्ञानाभावादिति भावः ॥

† ननु व्याप्तिज्ञाननियमः कल्प्यतामित्यनुशयेन युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

ness that the 'conclusion from likeness' is dependent on a knowledge of likeness, without reference to any knowledge of 'constant attendedness.' Moreover, we do not say [—in the case of the recognition of the *Bos Gavaeus*—] "I infer" (*anuminomi*), but "I conclude from its likeness [to a cow]" (*upaminomi*):—and so it is impossible that the 'conclusion from likeness,' thus rigorously ascertained [to be a specifically separate species of evidence], should be redargued:—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the examination as to whether the 'Argument of Likeness' be a [separate] kind of evidence.†

SECTION VIII.

EXAMINATION OF VERBAL EVIDENCE IN GENERAL.

c. With a view to testing [the pertinency of the definition of] verbal evidence, which presents itself next in order, he states a *primâ facie* view, as follows.‡

शब्दो ऽनुमानमर्थस्यानुपलब्धेरनुमेयत्वात् ॥ ४९ ॥

* अनुमानादुपमानस्य नाविशेषः । तथेत्युपसंहारात् । यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति ज्ञानादुपमानसिद्धेरुपमानाधीनसिद्धेरुपमितेः । तथाच व्याप्तिज्ञानानपेक्षसादृश्यज्ञानाधीनोपमितिरित्यनुभवसिद्धं । किञ्च नानुमिनोमि किन्तूपमिनोमीत्यनुव्यवसायसिद्धोपमितिर्नापलपितुं शक्यत इत्याशयः ।

† समाप्रमुपमानप्रामाण्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं शब्दं परीक्षितुं पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

A doubt whether testimony be other evidence than Inference.

Aph. 49.—Verbal evidence [—perhaps some one will say—] is a case of inference, because the thing, inasmuch as it is not perceived, must [—if known at all—] be *inferred*.

a. The complete sense is,—that verbal evidence consists in the ‘recognition of a Sign,’ so that its consequent ‘knowledge derived from verbal evidence’ (*śabda-bodha*) is an inference. And thus verbal evidence is, as a species of Sign, the instrumental cause of inferences,—because ‘the thing’ revealed by verbal evidence, as it is not ‘perceived,—i. e., is not an object of perception,—must be one inferred. And so the import here is, that ‘knowledge derived from verbal evidence’ is an inference,—either because its object is unperceived, or because it is different from what is perceived.*

b. He mentions another reason,† [in support of the *primâ facie* view].

उपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् ॥ ५० ॥

Another reason. *Aph. 50.*—[Knowledge derived from verbal evidence is not other than an inference,] because the apprehension [in the two cases] is not of two kinds.

a. ‘The apprehension,’—whether regarded under the character of verbal evidence, or regarded as an inference. ‘Because it

* शब्दो ऽनुमानमित्यस्य शब्दबोधो ऽनुमितिरिति पयव-
सितार्थस्तथाच शब्दो लिङ्गविधयानुमितिकरणं अर्थस्य
शब्दप्रतिपाद्यस्य अनुपलब्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वात् अनुमेयत्वादिति ।
तथाच शब्दज्ञानमनुमितिरप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात् प्रत्यक्षभिन्नत्वा-
द्वेत्यत्र तात्पर्यम् ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

is not of two kinds,'—or is not engaged in two ways. [Hence] to be an inference, and to be the result of verbal evidence, is not to be two [separate] kinds of things;—because, inasmuch as it is as a species of Sign, that a word conveys knowledge, it [—viz., knowledge resulting from verbal evidence—], being like knowledge resulting from any other Sign, is not generically different.*

b. He states another reason† [in support of the *primâ facie* view.]

सम्बन्धाच्च ॥ ५१ ॥

Another reason. *Aph.* 51.—And [knowledge derived from verbal evidence is not other than an inference] because of the connection [between the Sign and the thing signified, which is the same in the case of words and in that of other Signs].

a. 'Because of the connection,'—i. e., supplying the ellipsis, —because of the invariable concomitancy recognised. For a word conveys information inasmuch as it has reference to an apprehension of invariable concomitancy [between word and meaning, just such as exists, in the case of inference, between Sign and thing signified]. Hence knowledge derived from verbal evidence is an inference :—such is the import.‡

* उपलब्धेः शब्दत्वेनाभिमतया अनुमितित्वेनाभिमतयाश्च अदिप्रवृत्तित्वात् अदिप्रकारत्वात् अनुमितत्वं शब्दत्वञ्च न जातिद्वयं शब्दस्य लिङ्गविधया बोधकत्वात् लिङ्गान्तरजज्ञानवद्विजातीयत्वाभावात् ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ सम्बन्धान्नियतसम्बन्धात् ज्ञायमानादिति शेषः । शब्दो हि व्याप्तिग्रहसापेक्षो बोधयति । तेन शब्दबोधो अनुमितिरिति भावः ॥

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet [of the Nyáya, on this point, here follows].*

आप्नोपदेशसामर्थ्याच्छब्दार्थे सम्प्रत्ययः ॥ ५२ ॥

Reply to the objection. Aph. 52.—There is reliance on the matter evidenced by words, through the virtue of the enunciation of one worthy [to be trusted.]

a. 'Of one worthy,'—i. e., of one devoid of error, &c.;—what 'enunciation,'—i. e., verbal evidence;—what 'virtue' there is in that,—viz., the fact of being qualified by 'grammatical coherency' (*ákáñkshá*), 'adaptation of means to ends' (*yogyatá*), &c. [—see the *Tarka-sangraha*; §70]—from this† [it is, that we mean that certainty may be arrived at].

b. "By verbal evidence I *know* this,"—such is the phrase,—but not "I *infer*."‡

c. He declares further, that a word and its meaning are not connected§ [as in the *physically* established relation of Sign and thing signified].

पूरणदाहपाटनानुपपत्तेश्च सम्बन्धाभावः ॥ ५३ ॥

The sense not necessarily associated with the sound.

Aph. 53.—And there is no [invariable] connection [between the sound and the thing meant], because we do not find filling, burning, and splitting, [to accompany the words food, fire, and hatchet].

* सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† आप्नस्य भ्रमादिशून्यस्य य उपदेशः शब्दस्तत्र यत् सामर्थ्यं आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतादिमत्त्वं ततः ॥

‡ शब्दादमुमर्थं प्रत्येमि न त्वनुमिनेामीति ॥

§ शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धाभाव इत्यप्याह ॥

a. The thing is not connected with the word;—i. e., there is no constant attendedness [of the word by the thing]. He states the reason, saying, 'filling,' &c. If a word were constantly attended by what is meant by it, then by the words 'food,' 'fire,' and 'hatchet,' there should be a filling of the mouth,—a burning of the mouth, and a splitting of the mouth,—because, since [—on the hypothesis—] the word, viz., the thing constantly accompanied, is present, the thing also, viz., the food, &c., must be there also.*

b. How then,—does a word acquaint us even with a thing *not* connected with it? Were it so, then more things than enough would present themselves:—so he ponders this doubt.†

शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५४ ॥

Relation between sound and sense mooted.

Aph. 54.—Since there is a special allocation of words to meanings, [some one may suppose that] there is no negation [of their being mutually connected; just as, in physics, are the Sign and the thing signified].

a. 'There is no negation,'—i. e., it is not to be denied that there is a relation between sound and sense;—'since there is a special allocation of words to meanings;'—for only some one word denotes some one thing,—not every one everything. And since it is agreed that in this way there is a connection, constant

* शब्देन सद्दार्थस्य सम्बन्धाभावः व्याप्यभावः । हेतुमाह । पूरणेति । यदि शब्दस्यार्थेन व्याप्तिः स्यात् तदान्नाग्निवासी-शब्दैर्मुखपूरणमुखदाहमुखपाटनानि स्युः शब्दस्य व्याप्यस्य सत्त्वेनान्नादेरर्थस्यापि सत्त्वात् ॥

† तत् किं शब्दो ऽसम्बद्धमेवार्थं प्रत्याययति । तथा सत्य-तिप्रसङ्ग इत्याशङ्कते ॥

attendedness also is necessary through that connection;—and that connection does not [—nevertheless—] necessitate the filling of the mouth [when the word 'food' is uttered], &c :—such is the import* [of the doubt].

b. He replies.†

न सामयिकाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य ॥ ५५ ॥

This point determined. Aph. 55.—Nay,—for it is through its being conventionally qualified that the meaning of a word is understood.

a. In my opinion also words and meanings are not without their allocation [each to each]; for they have a relation in the shape of *power*, since the word is conventionally qualified to call up the meaning which belongs to it,—i. e., it is dependent on our apprehension of the power [—else the word calls up nothing]. And this is not [a case of] constant attendedness, because *that* is dependent on the relation which [—not conventionally but physically—] determines the [actual] conditions [of things] Such is the import.‡

जातिविशेषेचानियमात् ॥ ५६ ॥

* अप्रतिषेधः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धप्रतिषेधो न शब्दार्थयोर्व्यवस्थितत्वात् कश्चिदेव हि शब्दः कञ्चिदेवार्थं बोधयति न सर्वः सर्वमिति । इत्यञ्च सम्बन्धे स्वीकृते तेन सम्बन्धेन व्याप्तिरप्यावश्यकी सच सम्बन्धो न मुखपूरणादिनियामक इति भावः ॥

† उत्तरयति ॥

‡ मन्मतेऽपि शब्दार्थयोरव्यवस्था न शब्दस्याधीनस्यार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य सामयिकत्वात् शक्तिग्रहाधीनत्वात् शक्तिरूप-

No essential connection between sound and sense.

Aph. 56.—And [a word is not *naturally* connected with its sense], because it is not restricted to [the denotation of] any particular species.

a. There is no natural connection of any sound with any sense, 'because it is not restricted to any particular species,'—i. e., because we see that a word has not [—in the mouth of every one—] one [and the same] determinate sense.*

b. For, by the word *yava*, the Hindús understand a kind of long-awned [grain], but the barbarians panic-seed. But if there were a restriction [of each word to one and the same meaning], every one would understand every one [in the same sense as his neighbour]. But this is a matter of chance [—that two persons, of different countries, should use a word in the same sense]; because, even in the case of there being several powers [assigned to a word in a given language] in whichever of the senses each one understands it, that is the meaning of it which presents itself to him.†

c. Here ends the section on the examination of [the pertinency of the definition of] verbal evidence in general.‡

सम्बन्धेन । नच व्याप्तिस्तस्या वृत्तिनियामकसम्बन्धाधीनत्वादिति भावः ॥

* शब्दस्यार्थेन सह न स्वाभाविकः सम्बन्धः जातिविशेषेऽनियमात् । शब्दस्यानियतार्थकत्वदर्शनात् ॥

† आर्या हि यवशब्दादीर्घशूकविशेषं प्रतियन्ति स्तेच्छास्त कङ्कुमिति । नियमे तु सवेः सर्वं प्रतीयात् । आपाततत्त्वेदं नानाशक्तावपि यत्र यस्य शक्तिग्रहस्तस्य तदर्थोपस्थितेः ॥

‡ समाप्तं शब्दसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

SECTION IX.

EXAMINATION OF THE VARIETIES OF VERBAL EVIDENCE.

d. It was stated [—B. I. §8—] that verbal evidence is of two sorts, accordingly as it has reference to the seen or to the unseen; and, of these, with a view to try [the pertinency of the definition of] that verbal evidence, viz., the *Veda*, which has reference to the unseen, he states the *primâ facie* view.*

तदप्रामाण्यमच्यतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः ॥ ५७ ॥

Authority of the Veda questioned.

Aph. 57.—That [—viz., the *Veda*—] is no instrument of right knowledge, because of its faults of untruth, self-destructiveness, and tautology.

a. That verbal evidence, which is other than what has reference to the seen, viz., the *Veda*, is no instrument of right knowledge. Why? Because it has the faults of untruth, &c.†

b. And among these [faults of the *Veda*], there is untruth; because when the sacrifice for the sake of a son, or the like, has been made, we sometimes see that the fruit is not produced.‡

c. ‘Self-destructiveness’ is a contradiction between a prior and a subsequent [enunciation]. For example,—“Let him sacrifice

* शब्दस्य दृष्टादृष्टार्थकत्वेन द्वैविध्यमुक्तं तत्रचादृष्टार्थक-
शब्दस्य वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं परीक्षितुं पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

† तस्य दृष्टार्थकव्यतिरिक्तशब्दस्य वेदस्य अप्रामाण्यं।
कुतः। अच्यतत्वादिदोषात् ॥

‡ तत्रच पुत्रेष्टिकार्यादौ क्वचित् फलानुत्पत्तिदर्शनाद-
च्यतत्वम् ॥

when it is risen ;” [and again] “ Let him sacrifice when it has not risen.”*

d. The aphorism conveying the tenet.†

न कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् ॥ ५८ ॥

How the promises of the Veda fail to be fulfilled.

Aph. 58.—Nay,— [the default of the fruit is not in consequence of the untruthfulness of the *Veda*, but it comes] from some disqualification in the performance, in the operator, or in the instruments.

a. It is not the case that the *Veda* is no instrument of right knowledge, because the absence of the fruit arises ‘from some disqualification in the performance, in the operator, or in the instruments.’ Disqualification ‘in the performance,’ i. e., in the [sacrificial] act, consists in its not being according to rule, &c. Disqualification ‘in the operator,’ consists in his not being a learned man, &c. Disqualification ‘in the instruments,’ i. e., in the butter, &c., consists in their not being [duly] sprinkled, &c. For if the fruit were wanting when the thing was done as directed, then [indeed] there would be a case of untruthfulness ;—but it is not so :—such is the import.‡

* व्याघातः पूर्वापरविरोधः । यथा । उदिते जुहोति । अनुदिते जुहोति ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ न वेदाप्रामाण्यं कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् फलाभावोपपत्तेः । कर्मणः क्रियाया वैगुण्यमयथाविधित्वादि । कर्तुर्वैगुण्यमविद्वत्त्वादि । साधनस्य हविरादेवैगुण्यमप्रोक्षितत्वादि । यथोक्तकर्मणः फलाभावे ह्यनृतत्वं नचैवमस्तीति भावः ॥

b. He repels [the charge] of Self-destructiveness.*

अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात् ॥ ५९ ॥

Consistency of the Veda asserted.

Aph. 59.—[There is no inconsistency,] though you might allege the charge in respect of a different time from that which was intended.

a. Supply—"there is no self-destructiveness."†

b. There is no self-destructiveness [implied in the two apparently contradictory injunctions], though you might allege the charge aforesaid if, at the time of taking the fire, having intended, i. e., having agreed upon, the sacrifice after sunrise, for example, one were to perform the sacrifice before sunrise, or the like :—such is the meaning.‡

c. He repels [the charge of] tautology.§

अनुवादोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ६० ॥

The Veda denied to be tautological.

Aph. 60.—And [—the *Veda* is not chargeable with tautology, though things are reiterated in it—] since re-inculcation is suitable.

a. The "and" here has the sense of "again." 'Since re-inculcation is suitable,' again, there is no tautology. For it is when there is no motive [for the reiteration] that reiteration is a fault.||

• व्याघातं परिहरति ॥

† न व्याघात इति शेषः ॥

‡ अग्न्याधानकाले उदितहोमादिकमभ्युपेत्य स्वीकृत्या-
नुदितहोमादिकरणे पूर्वाक्तदोषकथनान्न व्याघात इत्यर्थः ॥

§ पौनरुक्त्यं परिहरति ॥

॥ चः पुनरर्थे । अनुवादोपपत्तेः पुनर्न पौनरुक्त्यं । निष्प्र-
योजनत्वे हि पौनरुक्त्यं दोषः ॥

b. He declares that the utility of re-inculcation is a settled point in the world.*

वाक्यविभागस्य चार्थग्रहणात् ॥ ६१ ॥

*Re-inculcation
not needless.*

*Aph. 61.—And because the utility is admitted
of this division of discourse.*

a. 'Because the utility is admitted,' i. e., because it is agreed, —supply "by the learned,"—that there is a motive,—'of this division of discourse,' i. e., of discourse divided [from the other species of discourse] by the character of re-inculcation. For the learned, having divided discourse according to the distinctions of enactive, re-inculcative, &c., hold that the re-inculcative also has its reasons. So is it in the case of the *Veda*:—such is the import.†

b. He shows the division of discourse in the case of the *Veda*.‡

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात् ॥ ६२ ॥

*Discourse
divided.*

*Aph. 62.—Because speech is distributed into in-
junction, persuasion, and re-inculcation.*

a. Through the distinction of hymn (*mantra*) and ritual (*bráh-
mana*) the *veda* is of two sorts. Of these, this division [—viz.,

* अनुवादस्य सार्थकत्वं लोकसिद्धमित्याह ॥

† वाक्यविभागस्य अनुवादत्वेन विभक्तवाक्यस्याथग्रह-
णात् प्रयोजनस्वीकारात् । शिष्टैरिति शेषः । शिष्टा हि
विधायकानुवादकादिभेदेन वाक्यं विभज्यानुवादकस्यापि
सप्रयोजनत्वं मन्यन्ते । वेदेऽप्येवमिति भावः ॥

‡ वेदे वाक्यविभागं दर्शयति ॥

that stated in the aphorism—] belongs to the ritual portion. Because the *Veda* is 'distributed,' i. e., divided, accordingly as the speech is an injunction, or as the speech is one of persuasion, or as the speech is one of re-inculcation. Or,—'because it is distributed,'—i. e., because of the distinction;—and so, through the distinction of injunction, &c.,—supply "the ritual-portion is tripartitely divided."*

b. Among these he states the characteristic of an injunction (*vidhi*).†

विधिर्विधायकः ॥ ६३ ॥

An injunction what.

Aph. 63.—An injunction is that which enjoins.

a. An injunction is a speech in which there is articulated an affix indicative that something is the means of good :—e. g., "Let him that desires Paradise perform the fire-sacrifice."‡

b. 'Persuasion' (*arthavāda*) is the setting forth of the end, i. e., of the motive;—that is to say, it is a speech intended to commend the object of an injunction. For a persuasive speech, by means of laudation, &c., commends the object of an injunction

* मन्त्रब्राह्मणभेदाद्दिधा वेदस्तत्र ब्राह्मणस्यायं विभागः ।
विधिवचनत्वेनार्थवादवचनत्वेनानुवादवचनत्वेनच वेदस्य
विनियोगात् विभजनात् । अथवा विनियोगात् भेदात् ।
तथाच विध्यादिभेदाद्ब्राह्मणभागस्त्रिधेति शेषः ॥

† तत्र विधिलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ इष्टसाधनताबोधकप्रत्ययसमभिव्याहृतवाक्यं विधिः ।
अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकाम इत्यादि ॥

with a view to our quickly engaging* [in the performance of the ceremony enjoined].

c. With reference to this, he divides Persuasion according to the distinction of Laudation, &c.†

स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इत्यर्थवादः ॥ ६४ ॥

Topics of per-
suasion.

Aph. 64.—Laudation, Blame, Warning, and Prescription,—such are [the topics of] Persuasion.

a. Laudation (*stuti*) is speech directly calculated to commend the purpose of an injunction.‡

b. Blame (*nindā*) is that which urges the motive of the injunction by means of acquainting us with the undesirable§ [consequences of neglecting it].

c. Warning (*para-kṛiti*) is the mentioning of something mutually opposed to what belonged to some particular person,|| [—and which “act of that other,” as having led to bad consequences, ought to serve as a warning].

d. Prescription (*purākalpa*) implies the mention of something

* अर्थवादः अर्थस्य प्रयोजनस्य वहनं । विध्यर्थप्रशंसा-
परं वचनमित्यर्थः । अर्थवादे हि स्तुत्यादिद्वारा विध्यर्थं
शीघ्रं प्रवृत्तये प्रशंसति ॥

† तत्र स्तुत्यादिभेदादर्थवादं विभजते ॥

‡ स्तुतिः साक्षाद्विध्यर्थस्य प्रशंसार्थकं वाक्यं ॥

§ अनिष्टबोधनद्वारा विध्यर्थप्रवर्त्तकं निन्दा ॥

॥ पुरुषविशेषनिष्ठमित्येव विरुद्धकथनं परकृतिः ॥

as having been handed down by tradition,* [and commended by this "conjecture of its antiquity"].

e. He states the characteristic of re-inculcation† (*anuvāda*).

विधिविहितस्यानुवचनमनुवादः ॥ ६५ ॥

Re-inculcation what. Aph. 65.—Re-inculcation is the mentioning subsequently of what has been enjoined by an injunction.

a. The mentioning 'subsequently,' i. e. afterwards, of what has already presented itself, with a motive [for the reiteration], is Re-inculcation:—such is the generic character. Its peculiarity is [its being the reiteration] 'of what has been enjoined by an injunction;—that is to say, there is the re-inculcation of the injunction, and the re-inculcation of what was enjoined.‡

b. And this division of Persuasion and of Re-inculcation belongs to passages which are enounced as *injunctions*;—therefore, though it does not include theological passages, which are in the shape of *statements of fact*, there is no defect.§

c. He ponders a doubt.||

* ऐतिह्यसमाचरिततया कीर्त्तनं पुराकल्पः ॥

† अनुवादलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ प्राप्तस्य अनु पश्चात् कथनं सप्रयोजनमनुवाद इति सामान्यलक्षणम् । तद्विशेषो विधिविहितस्येति विध्यनुवादो विहितानुवादश्चेत्यर्थः ॥

§ अयञ्चार्थवादानुवादविभागे विधिसमभिख्याहृतवाक्यानां तेन भूतार्थवाटरूपाणां वेदान्तवाक्यानामपरिग्रहान्न न्यूनता ॥

॥ शङ्कते ॥

नानुवादपुनरुक्तयोर्विशेषः शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः ॥ ६६ ॥

*Whether Re-inculcation
differ from Tautology.*

Aph. 66.—[Perhaps some one will say,] there is no difference between Re-inculcation and Tautology, because what presents itself [in either case] is a repetition of some expression.

a. That is to say, Re-inculcation is not different from Tautology; because 'what presents itself,' i. e. what there really is [in the one case as in the other] is a 'repetition of some expression,' i. e., a repetition, or employment over again, of an expression, the sense of which has been already communicated.*

b. He clears up this doubt.†

शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवदभ्यासाद् विशेषः ॥ ६७ ॥

*Re-inculcation not
tautological.*

Aph. 67.—Since there is a re-employment, like the instruction to go faster, it [—viz., re-inculcation—] does differ [from mere reiteration].

a. It is not the case that Re-inculcation does not differ from reiteration; 'since there is a re-employment,' i. e., since there is a motive for the re-employment. He states an illustration of this,—saying 'faster,' &c. As in the world, after having said "go on," one says over again "go on, go on," &c., for the purpose of signifying that there should be no delay in the action, or the like,—so is it in the case in question.‡

* शब्दाभ्यासस्य बोधितार्थकशब्दस्य यो ऽभ्यासः पुनः प्रयोगस्तस्योपपत्तेः सत्त्वात् अनुवादः पुनरुक्तान्न भिद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ अनुवादस्य पुनरुक्तान्नाविशेषः । अभ्यासात् । अभ्यासस्य सप्रयोजनत्वात् । तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह शीघ्रेति । यथा लोके

b. Having thus repelled what would go to prove that it [—viz., the *Veda*—] is no instrument of right knowledge, he demonstrates that it is an instrument of right knowledge.*

मन्त्रायुर्वेदवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमात्रप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ६८ ॥

Argument for the authority of the Veda.

Aph. 68.—And the fact of its being a cause of right knowledge, like the hymns and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit one [who gave the *Veda*] was a source of right knowledge.

a. Since a fit person, a maker of *Veda* [—i. e., of knowledge—], is a cause of right knowledge,—i. e., is a teacher of what is true, it may be gathered from the sense of the terms that the *Veda* was delivered by such a one. By means of this reason it is to be inferred that the *Veda* is a cause of right knowledge. He states an example in respect of this—‘like the hymns and the medical science.’ A hymn [or spell] counteracts poison, &c., and a portion of the medical science exists in the *Veda*. Since these, by universal consent, are held to be causes of right knowledge, by means of this example, in so far forth as anything is *Veda*, its being a cause of right knowledge is to be inferred.†

गम्यतामित्युक्त्वा पुनर्गम्यतां गम्यतामित्यादि कर्माविलम्बादिबोधार्थमुच्यते तथा प्रकृतेऽपीति ।

* एवमप्रामाण्यसाधकं निरस्य प्रामाण्यं साधयति ।

† आप्रस्य वेदकर्तुः प्रामाण्यात् यथार्थोपदेशकत्वात् वेदस्य तदुक्तत्वमर्थाल्लब्धं । तेन हेतुना वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमनुमेयं । तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह मन्त्रायुर्वेदवदिति । मन्त्रो विषादिनाशकः आयुर्वेदभागश्च वेदस्य एव । तत्र संवादेन प्रामाण्यग्रहात् तद्दृष्टान्तेन वेदत्वावच्छेदेन प्रामाण्यमनुमेयम् ।

b. Some [explain it otherwise, and these] say :—that is [—in accordance with the etymology called] *Veda* where the fact of being a cause of right knowledge is found, or admitted ;—and by its having such character of *Veda*, the fact of its being a cause of right knowledge is to be inferred.*

c. Here ends the section on the examination of the varieties of verbal evidence.†

d. So much for the first daily portion, entitled “The Examination of Proof and its Subservients, without reference to the examination of its division,” in the commentary, on the Aphorisms of the Nyāya, composed by the venerable Viśwanātha Bhaṭṭāchārya.‡

THE SECOND DIURNAL PORTION.

e. Now the examination of Proof with reference to its division ; and this it is that is the matter of this Diurnal Portion. And in this there are four sections. Among these there is, in the first place, the section of the enquiry whether they be four ; and the others will be mentioned in their several places. On this point [—of the kinds of evidence being four—] we have an aphorism of objection.§

* आप्तं गृहीतं प्रामाण्यं यत्र स वेदस्तादृशेन वेदत्वेन प्रामाण्यमनुमेयमिति केचित् ।

† समाप्तं शब्दविशेषपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ इति श्रीविश्वनाथभट्टाचार्यकृतायां न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ विभागपरीक्षानिरपेक्षसाङ्गप्रमाणपरीक्षणं नाम द्वितीयस्याद्यमाह्निकम् ॥

§ अथ विभागसापेक्षप्रमाणपरीक्षणं तदेवचाह्निकार्थः ।

SECTION X.

ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE KINDS OF EVIDENCE ARE

FOUR IN NUMBER.

न चतुष्टमैतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ६९ ॥

Whether the kinds of evidence be four.

Aph. 69.—[The Mīmāṃsaka will say—] they are not four [only], because Rumour, Conjecture, Probability, and Non-existence, are [also] causes of right knowledge.

a. The kinds of evidence 'are not four,'—i. e., the fact of being a cause of right knowledge is not invariably attended by the fact of being one or other of the set of four aforesaid [—see B. I. §3—]; because it belongs to others than those stated.*

b. In regard to this, he explains how it belongs to others, saying 'Rumour' &c. A rumour (*aitihya*) is what is expressed in this way—"thus indeed people say," &c. For it is an assertion which has come from one to another, without any first assertor being indicated:—for example, "In every Bengal fig-tree there is a goblin," and the like. And this is not included under verbal evidence, because there is no certainty of its having been declared [in the first instance,] by one worthy [of credit]:—such is the import.†

चत्वारिचात्र प्रकरणानि । तत्रादौ चतुष्टुपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ।
अन्यानिच तत्र तत्र वक्ष्यन्ते । तत्राक्षेपसूत्रम् ॥

* प्रमाणानां न चतुष्टुं । प्रमाणत्वं नोक्तचतुष्कान्यतम-
त्वव्याप्यं । उक्तान्यवृत्तित्वात् ॥

† तत्रान्यवृत्तित्वं व्युत्पादयति ऐतिह्येत्यादि । ऐतिह्यं
इति होचुरित्यनेन प्रकारेण यदुच्यते । तद्वि अनिर्दिष्टप्रव-

c. Conjecture (*arthápatī*) is, from a thing unaccounted for, the imagining the producer of it; for example, from rain, the knowledge of [there having been] clouds. Since the cloud is not in the same place with the rain, this is not an instance of constant attendedness; and therefore the case does not fall under the head of Inference.*

d. Probability (*sambhava*) is knowledge dependent on frequent concomitancy. For example:—"it is probable that there is learning in a Bráhmaṇ,"—"it is probable that among a thousand there are a hundred." And here there is no reference to constant attendedness [—which would bring the case under the head of Inference—];—such is the import.†

e. But [the proof from] Non-existence is, in dependence on the knowledge of the absence of one opposite, [out of two], the conjecturing of the other opposite:—for example, on our knowing that the ichneumon is absent, the conjecturing of the ichneumon's adversary, the snake. Here also there is no reference to constant attendedness:—such is the import.‡

क्तृकं परम्परागतं वाक्यं यथा वटे वटे यक्ष इत्यादि ।
तस्य चाप्रोक्तत्वा निश्चयान्न शब्दे ऽन्तर्भाव इति भावः ॥

* अर्थापत्तिरनुपपद्यमानेनार्थेनोपपादककल्पनं यथा
दृष्ट्या मेघज्ञानं । दृष्ट्या सह मेघस्य वैयधिकरण्यान्न व्याप्तिरिति
नानुमाने ऽन्तर्भावः ॥

† सम्भवो भूयस्सहचाराधीनज्ञानं । यथा । सम्भवति
ब्राह्मणे विद्या । सम्भवति सहस्रे शतं । अत्र च व्याप्तिर्नापे-
क्षितेत्याशयः ॥

‡ अभावस्तु विरोध्यभावज्ञानाधीनविरोध्यन्तरकल्पनं ।

f. Or the import may be, that [the proof from] Non-existence is, from the knowledge of the *absence* of the cause &c., the [consequent] knowledge of the absence of the effect &c.; for it is only constant attendedness belonging to something *positive* that is subservient to *Inference*.*

g. The aphorism conveying the tenet.†

शब्द ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावादनुमाने ऽर्थापत्तिसम्भवा-
भावानामनर्थान्तरभावाच्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ७० ॥

*The kinds of evidence not
more than four.*

Aph. 70.—Since Rumour is nothing else than verbal evidence, and since Conjecture, Probability, and [the argument from] Non-existence, are nothing else than Inference, there is no opposing [our division into four].

a. There is no opposing the quaternion of Proofs, since Rumour is nothing else than verbal evidence, i. e., is included under it. Although generally there may be the knowledge whether the assertion were that of one worthy, yet in reality the knowledge of the assertion's being that of one worthy is not a cause in respect of what [knowledge in general] is derived from verbal evidence, but [the cause is] the knowledge of the interdependence &c. [of the words,—see *Tarka-Sangraha*, §70]; and *right* knowledge derived from verbal evidence is dependent on

यथा । नकुलाभावज्ञाने नकुलविरोधिना व्यालस्य कल्पनं ।
अत्रापि व्याप्तिर्नापेक्षितेत्याशयः ॥

* अथवा कारणाभावादिना कार्यभावादिज्ञानं अभावः
भावनिष्ठव्याप्तिरेवानुमानाङ्गमित्याशयः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

right knowledge of the 'fitness'* [of the things spoken of, to produce the fact asserted:—see, further, *Tarka-Sangraha*, §73].

b. Conjecture &c. are included under Inference; because, without an idea of constant attendedness, the supposition of a producer is impossible. Moreover, in the [fact of a portion of water's] being rain, for instance, there really is constant attendedness, by the fact of being produced from a cloud.†

c. Probability also, as it has its root in constant attendedness, is Inference; and if it have *no* reference to constant attendedness, then it has not the character of evidence, because it may stray away‡ [where the thing which it vouches for is not present].

d. In like manner, Non-existence [—as furnishing evidence—], having respect to constant attendedness, is Inference. And, since constant attendedness *does* belong to a negative [—as well as to things positive,—notwithstanding what is alleged under §69, *f*—], there is no inconsistency in its being one member [in the subdivision] of Inference:—such is the import.§

* न प्रमाणचतुष्टयस्य प्रतिषेधः शब्दे ऐतिह्यस्यानर्थान्तरभावादन्तर्भावात् सामान्यत आप्नोक्तत्वज्ञानसम्भवाद्दस्तुत आप्नोक्तत्वज्ञानं न शब्दे कारणं किन्तु कांक्षादिज्ञानं योग्यताप्रमाधीना च शब्दप्रमेति ॥

† अर्थापत्त्यादेरनुमाने ऽन्तर्भावः । उपपादककल्पनं हि विना व्याप्तिज्ञानं न सम्भवति । दृष्टित्वादावपि मेघजन्यत्वव्याप्तिरस्त्येव ॥

‡ सम्भवो ऽपि व्याप्तिमूलकत्वादनुमानं । व्याप्तिनपेक्षित्वे च व्यभिचारादप्रामाण्यम् ॥

§ एवमभावो व्याप्तिसापेक्षो ऽनुमानं । अभावनिष्ठव्याप्तेश्चानुमानाङ्गत्वे न विरोध इति भावः ॥

e. An indifferent person [—neither a follower of the Nyáya nor of the Mímánsá—] propounds the following doubt,—that there might be a question whether it [viz., Conjecture,] were not included, or were included [under Inference], if Conjecture *were* any cause of right knowledge,—but that it really is not so.*

अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ ७१ ॥

A doubt whether Conjecture be any cause of right knowledge.

Aph. 71.—Conjecture [—says some one—] is no cause of right knowledge, because of its indeterminateness.

a. A case of Conjecture (*arthápatti*) is this, that, since there is no rain when there is no cloud, where there *is* a cloud there is rain :—and here [—says the objector—] there is not the character of producing right knowledge, because of indeterminateness ; because, even when there *is* a cloud, there is [frequently] no rain.†

b. He clears up this doubt.‡

अनर्थापत्तावर्थापत्त्यभिमानात् ॥ ७२ ॥

Conjecture defended.

Aph. 72.—[Indeterminateness does not necessarily belong to Conjecture,] because [when you allege this fault,] you suppose that to be a [legitimate] Conjecture which is no [legitimate] Conjecture.

* सत्यर्थापत्तेः प्रामाण्ये बहिर्भावान्तर्भावचिन्ता तदेव तु नास्तीति तटस्थः शङ्कते ॥

† असति मेघे दृष्टिर्न भवतीत्यनेन सति मेघे दृष्टिर्भवती-
त्यर्थापत्तिविषयस्तत्र च न प्रामाण्यं सत्यपि मेघे दृष्ट्यभावा-
दनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

a. Indeterminateness does not [necessarily] belong to Conjecture :—so much is wanting* [to complete the aphorism].

b. And, in regard to the example [§71, *a*] “Where there is a cloud there is rain, because there is no rain where there are no clouds,”—we agree that the knowledge of [the existence of] a cloud [may be gained] by rain;—but where the notion of [the existence of] rain [is deduced] from [the existence of] a cloud, there we have the mistake of [supposing that there is what we here render] a Conjecture when it is no [legitimate] Conjecture.†

c. And this is not inconsistent with its [viz., Conjecture’s] character of being a cause of right notion, because [if this were enough to debar anything’s being a cause of right notion, then] we should find that even *Inference* is no cause of right notion.—for we see that there are also *erroneous* inferences through error in regard to the constant attendedness [—leading to the formal error of Non-distribution of the Middle Term—], &c.‡

d. Some write, at the commencement of this aphorism, the expression “Indeterminateness does not belong to Conjecture,” [which is, in truth,] the introduction [of the aphorism] in the *Bhāshya*.§

* अर्थापत्तेर्नानैकान्तिकत्वमिति शेषः ॥

† असत्तु मेघेषु न दृष्टिरित्यनेन सति मेघे दृष्टिरिति तत्र च दृष्ट्या मेघज्ञानमभिमतं। यत्र च मेघेन दृष्टिज्ञानं तत्रानर्थापत्तावर्थापत्तिभ्रमः ॥

‡ न च प्रामाण्यविरोधः व्याख्यादिभ्रमाद्भ्रमानुमितिदर्शनादनुमानस्याप्यप्रामाण्यापत्तेः ॥

§ नानैकान्तिकत्वमर्थापत्तेरिति भाव्यस्यावतारणिकां सूत्रादौ केचिन्निखन्ति ॥

e. He states also a bar* [to the objection].

प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यञ्चानैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ ७३ ॥

*The objector's argument
retorted.*

Aph. 73.—And [if the argument alleged at §71 were valid,] the *objection* would be invalid, through its indeterminateness.

a. According to your showing, your objection also would be invalid, through indeterminateness;—because nowhere can we manage to set aside the charge of indeterminateness, since there is [on *your* showing, in respect of every argument that could be made use of, for that or any other purpose, the fault of] indeterminateness.†

b. Now, if you [—the objector,—in reply to this retort,—] say, the fact of indeterminateness is not *everywhere* a fault, but in respect of itself [it is a valid mode of argumentation], then [by parity of reasoning] Conjecture also is not invalid:—so he says as follows:—‡

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा नार्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ७४ ॥

Another retort. *Aph 74.*—Or, if that be valid, then Conjecture is not invalid.

a. If you hold that your own argument is valid, because what is indeterminate is sufficient in respect of itself [—i. e., is a

* प्रतिबन्धिनमप्याह ॥

† त्वदुक्तरीत्या त्वदीयप्रतिषेधस्याप्यप्रामाण्यं स्यादनैकान्तिकत्वात् । यत्र कुत्रचिदनैकान्तिकत्वस्य प्रतिषेधासाधकत्वादैनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥

‡ अथ यत्र कुत्रचिदनैकान्तिकत्वं न दोषाय किन्तु स्वविषये इति यदि तदार्थापत्तेरपि नाप्रामाण्यमित्याह ॥

sufficiently good form of argument where that particular form of argument is under trial—], then Conjecture also is valid in respect of itself,* [—and an argument from Conjecture may as fairly be employed to establish the validity of arguing from Conjecture, as an argument that proves indeterminately can be employed to invalidate forms of argument alleged to prove indeterminately].

b. An indifferent person propounds the doubt that Non-existence is not included among the causes of right notion.†

नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेः ॥ ७५ ॥

A doubt whether Non-existence be any cause of right knowledge.

Aph. 75.—Non-existence [says some one,] is no cause of right notion, since no object of such knowledge exists.

a. There might then be a cause of right knowledge called Non-existence, if there really existed, in respect thereof, any object of right knowledge; but there is really none such:—that is to say, since Nonentity is mere emptiness, we cannot deal with it as if there were here a cause of right knowledge.‡

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.§

लक्षितेष्वलक्षणलक्षितत्वादलक्षितानां तत्प्रमेय-
सिद्धिः ॥ ७६ ॥

* अनैकान्तिकत्वस्य स्वविषये साधकत्वादयदि स्वहेतोः प्रामाण्यं मन्यसे तदार्थापत्तेरपि स्वविषये प्रामाण्यमिति ॥

† अभावस्य न प्रमाणे ऽन्तर्भाव इति तटस्थः शङ्कते ॥

‡ अभावनामकं प्रमाणं तदा स्याद्यदि तस्य प्रमेयं सिद्धेत् तदेव तु नास्ति । अभावस्य तुच्छत्वान्न तत्र प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरिति भावः ॥

§ सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

*How Non-existence serves
to mark out.*

Aph. 76.—By their not being marked by the mark [that is found] in things [thereby] marked, it [viz., Non-existence,] has, as its objects of right knowledge, the things *not* [thereby] marked.

a. Although Non-existence cannot be marked by a Quality, an Action, &c., still it is marked by the *absence* of a mark;—for, when we say “Bring the one which is *not* blue,” the absence of blueness, by excluding others [which *are* blue], is a mark;—therefore Non-existence is not invalid evidence:—such is the import.*

b. Hinting an objection, he clears it up.†

असत्यर्थे नाभाव इति चेन्नान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः ॥ ७७ ॥

*An objection to Non-
existence disposed of.*

Aph. 77.—If you say that where the thing exists not, its Non-existence is not,—it is not so; because the mark is possible elsewhere.

a. You cannot [—says an objector—] talk of a Non-existence (*abhāva*) where there is no counter-entity (*pratiyogi*); and where there *is* the counter-entity, how can there be its Non-existence? If any one says this, it is not so,—because ‘it is possible,’ i. e., the Non-existence is possible through there being *elsewhere* the ‘mark,’ that is to say, the actual existence of the counter-entity. For it is not looked for that the counter-entity should actually be in that very place‡ [where its Non-existence is].

* यद्यप्यभावस्य गुणकर्मादिभिर्लक्षणं न सम्भवति तथा-
प्यलक्षणेनैव तल्लक्षितं भवति । अनीलमानयेत्युक्ते नीला-
भावो हि इतरव्यावर्तकतया लक्षणं । अतो ऽभावो नाप्रा-
माणिक इति भावः ॥

† आक्षिप्य समाधत्ते ॥

‡ असति प्रतियोगिन्यभावो वक्तुं न शक्यते सतिच प्रति-

b. He ponders a doubt.*

तत्सिद्धेरलक्षितेष्वहेतुः ॥ ७८ ॥

Whether the absence of a mark can mark.

Aph. 78.—Though it effect that, [where it, viz., some mark, is *present*,] yet [some one may object,] in what things are *not* marked, it [viz., the Non-existence of the mark,] is no cause [of precision].

a. Though some mark, in things that *are* marked, 'effect that,'—i. e., effect discrimination, yet, in what things are *not* marked, 'it is no cause,' i. e., non-existence [of the mark] is no cause, is excluded as a cause ;—that is to say, what has no essence, for there is the *absence* of the mark, cannot define.†

b. He clears up this.‡

न लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षासिद्धेः ॥ ७९ ॥

This doubt disposed of.

Aph. 79.—Nay,—[a Non-existence is not ineffectual as a mark,] because it does exist in relation to the presence of the [positive] mark [of which it is the absence].

a. The *primâ facie* view [taken in §78,] is not right, because such a thing [as the Non-existence that we speak of,] does exist

योगिनि कथं तदभाव इति चेन्न । अन्यत्र लक्षणो न सत्त्वेना-
र्यात् प्रतियोगिनः । उपपत्तेरभावोपपत्तेः । न हि तत्रैव
प्रतियोगिनः सत्त्वमपेक्षितम् ॥

* शङ्कते ॥

† लक्षितेषु लक्षणस्य तत्सिद्धेः व्यावर्त्तकत्वसिद्धेरलक्षि-
तेषु अहेतुः अहेतुत्वं व्यावर्त्तहेतुत्वं अभावस्य लक्षणाभावा-
न्निःस्वरूपस्य न व्यावर्त्त्यत्वमिति भावः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

in relation to the presence, i. e., the existence, of the character which is its counter-entity. The meaning is this. Since it is only through the knowledge of the nature of some counter-entity that it is possible to describe the nature of any Non-existence, we are not to expect any mark of the Non-existence [itself]:—such is the import.*

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ८० ॥

Non-existence when discernible.

Aph. 80.—And [there really is what may be rightly known thereby,—i. e., by means of a Non-existence as a mark,] because we find the Non-existence antecedently to the production [of its counter-entity].

a. ‘There really is what may be rightly known,’—so much is supplied, by a frog-leap† [—not from the aphorism immediately preceding, but from §76].

b. Because every one has a preception the object of which is such an antecedent Non-existence as [is implied in the expression] “There *will* be a jar” [which as yet is Non-existent in the halves which are destined to compose it]; because ‘we find,’ i. e., we perceive, the Non-existence ‘antecedently to the production’—viz.,—of the counter-entity:—such is the import.‡

* पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः प्रतियोगिनो लक्षणस्य यदवस्थित-
मवस्थानं तस्यापेक्षया तादृशसिद्धेः । अयमर्थः । प्रतियोगिस्व-
रूपज्ञानादेवाभावस्वरूपनिरूपणसम्भवान्नाभावलक्षापेक्षेति
भावः ॥

† प्रमेयसिद्धिरिति मण्डूकमुत्यानुवर्तते ॥

‡ प्रतियोगिन उत्पत्तेः प्राक् अभावस्य उपपत्तेः उपल-
म्भात् घटो भविष्यतीत्यादिप्रागभावविषयकप्रत्यक्षस्य सार्व-
लौकिकत्वादिति भावः ॥

c. By the 'and,' it is included that also Emergent Non-existence and the others are established by perception,* [—the fact that the jar, on being broken, has ceased to exist, being a matter of ocular cognizance].

d. [Since *gestures* also may communicate right knowledge, it may be remarked that,] if Gesture had no *modus operandi* [—as a Sign, e. g., produces knowledge through the special operation of syllogizing—*parámarśa*—], then it would be no species of evidence :—but, in reality, since, like alphabetical characters, &c., it is a conventional thing, it also is included under Inference or under Verbal Evidence.†

e. Here ends the section on the question whether there be a quaternion of kinds of evidence.‡

SECTION XI.

RESPECTING THE NON-ETERNITY OF SOUND.

f. There being the doubt, that the authority of the Veda is established by the authority of one worthy [of credit], and that this is inconsistent, since the Veda is eternal,—he [therefore,] commences the subject of the *non-eternity* of Sound, on the ground that, since *letters* are not eternal, how can the Veda, which is in the shape of an aggregate of these, be eternal? In regard to this, the aphorism conveying the tenet§ [here follows].

* चकारेण ध्वंसादेरपि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वं समुच्चीयते ॥

† चेष्टाया निर्व्यापारत्वेन न प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतो लिप्यादिवत् साङ्केतिकत्वात् तस्या अप्यनुमाने शब्दे वान्तर्भाव इति ॥

‡ समाप्तं प्रमाणचतुष्टयप्रकरणम् ॥

§ वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमात्रप्रामाण्यात् सिद्धं नचेदं युज्यते वेदस्य नित्यत्वादित्याशङ्कायां वर्णानामनित्यत्वात् कथं तत्त-

आदिमत्त्वाद्वैन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकादुपचाराच्च ॥ ८१ ॥

The eternity of Sound denied.

Aph. 81.—From its having an origin, from its being cognizable by sense, and from its being spoken of as factitious, [Sound is not eternal].

a. Sound is not eternal, &c., 'from its having an origin,' i. e., from its having a cause. But then [—some may argue—] it has *not* a cause, because it may be accounted for, [not only by causal origination, but,] moreover, by *manifestation*, [—see the Mīmāṃsā Aphorisms, B. I.—] through the impact &c. of the throat, palate, &c.: so he adds 'from its being cognizable by sense.' 'From its being perishable,' i. e., from its being destructible, like anything artificial.*

b. He considers the doubt whether there be not a fallacy in the arguments in the preceding† [aphorism].

न घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वान्नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुप- चाराच्च ॥ ८२ ॥

The preceding arguments questioned.

Aph. 82.—Nay, because the Non-existence of a jar, and its genus, are eternal, [though the arguments in the preceding aphorism, if valid, would

मुदायरूपस्य वेदस्य नित्यत्वमित्याशयेन शब्दानित्यत्वप्रकरणमारभते । तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

* शब्दोऽनित्य इत्यादिः आदिमत्त्वात् सकारणकत्वात् । ननु न सकारणकत्वं कण्ठताल्लाद्यभिघातादेर्व्यञ्जकत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेरत आह ऐन्द्रियकत्वादिति । कृतकेति । कृतके घटादौ ॥

† यथाश्रुते हेतूनां व्यभिचारमाशङ्कते ॥

apply to them,] and eternal things also are spoken of as if uneternal.

a. The aforesaid are not [valid] reasons. The fact of having a beginning strays away [from things uneternal, of which you imagine it to be exclusively characteristic],—because ‘the non-existence of a jar,’ i. e., the destruction of a jar [—which had a beginning when the jar was broken—], is ‘eternal,’ i. e., indestructible. The fact of being cognizable by sense belongs unduly [—so far as your argument is concerned—] to Genus, [—for, when a jar is seen, its Genus, i. e., the fact of its being a jar, is visible also;—yet Genus is eternal]. ‘Because eternal things also are spoken of as if uneternal,’—as when it is said, “The jar’s space is produced” [—whereas only a certain portion of eternal space is now divided off and occupied by the newly produced jar—],—“I have become happy” [—though the “happy I” has not just come into existence, having existed always], &c.*

b. He repels the [charge of] fallacy.†

तत्त्वभाक्त्येर्नानात्वस्य विभागादव्यभिचारः ॥ ८३ ॥

The first objection repelled. *Aph.* 83.—Through the distinction of the diversity between the real and the dependent, there is not the fallacy [alleged in §82].

a. Through the ‘distinction,’ i. e., the difference, of the ‘diversity,’ i. e., the severalty of ‘the real,’ i. e., the absolutely existent, and the ‘dependent’ [or not substantially existent], there is no straying away [of the alleged character of things uneternal

† नेक्ता हेतवः घटाभावस्य घटध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वादविनाशित्वादादिमत्त्वं व्यभिचारि । ऐन्द्रियकत्वं सामान्ये व्यभिचारि । नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचारात् यथा घटाकाशमुत्पन्नं अहं सुखी जात इत्यादि ॥

* व्यभिचारं परिहरति ॥

to things eternal]. For, in the case of destruction [on emergent non-existence], its being produced [certainly] implies its having a beginning ;—but, the fact of not having that eternalness which consists in the fact of belonging to the three times [—past and present as well as future—], is really to be *not* eternal. That a thing is eternal because indestructible [—while not having existed *from* eternity—] is a figure of speech. Therefore there is no straying away* [as alleged].

b. Or the meaning is, that, by 'having a beginning' is meant the fact of being an *entity*, this being specialized by the fact of having previously not existed ;—and a Non-existence is not [such a thing as] this.†

c. He refutes [the charge of] fallacy in respect of the second‡ [reason].

सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात् ॥ ८४ ॥

The second objection repelled.

Aph. 84.—Because, in the inference of a son, [it is] through a distinction.

a. 'In the inference of a son,' i. e., in the making the conclusion [that "This is such a one's son"], it is through the distinction of some token [and not through our directly perceiving in him the generic character of sonship,] that the son is regarded

* तत्त्वस्य पारमार्थिकस्य भाक्तस्य च नानात्वस्य भेदस्य विभागात् विवेकान्न व्यभिचारः । ध्वंसे हि उत्पत्तिमत्त्वं आदिमत्त्वं त्रैकालिकत्वरूपनित्यत्वाभावरूपञ्चानित्यत्वमस्त्वेव । अविनाशित्वान्नित्यत्वमौपचारिकमतो न व्यभिचारः ॥

† आदिमत्त्वं प्रागभावावच्छिन्नसत्त्वं नचैतदभाव इति वार्थः ॥

‡ द्वितीये व्यभिचारमुद्धरति ॥

as a son,—recognised as peculiarized by that single character. Therefore, according to the maxim “ Since there is the possession of the genus,” &c., there requires to be a distinction,* [—and this is not the case with the perception of Sound, which is direct and simple].

b. He sets aside the [charge of] fallacy in respect of the third† [reason].

कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात् ॥ ८५ ॥

The third objection repelled.

Aph. 85.—It is through a causal [ungenerated] substance’s being designated by the term Position, [that it comes to be spoken of as a thing produced].

a. There is really no cause of [the Ether or] Space ; but the treating of Space as if made up of positions is figurative ;—because, by the word Position, a thing that is [only] a cause gets the name of a thing that *has* a cause ;—and Space is not such a thing.‡

b. So in the example “ I have become happy,” &c., it is only the production of the happiness, &c., [and not of the percipient soul,] that is the matter [of the proposition] :—such is the import.§

* सन्तानानुमानेऽनुमितिकरणे लिङ्गविशेषणात् सन्तानः सन्तन्यमानः एकधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वेन ज्ञायमानः । तेन सामान्यवत्त्वे सतीति विशेषणीयमिति ॥

† तृतीये व्यभिचारं वारयति ॥

‡ आकाशे हेतुर्नास्त्येव आकाशे प्रादेशिकत्वव्यवहारस्तु गौणः प्रदेशशब्देन कारणद्रव्यस्य कारणवतो द्रव्यस्याभिधानात् । नचाकाशं तादृशम् ॥

§ एवं सुखी जात इत्यादौ सुखाद्युत्पत्तिरेव विषय इति भावः ॥

c. And it is not the case that there was nothing to call for [the enunciation of] the aforesaid reasons, because they are refuters of the opposite opinion, as he declares as follows.*

प्रागुच्चारणादनूपलम्भादावरणादनूपलब्धेः ॥ ८६ ॥

Application of the previous arguments.

Aph. 86.—[Sound is not eternal,] because it is not perceived antecedently to pronounciation, and because we do not perceive any veil, &c., [so that it might exist unperceived].

a. If sound were eternal, then it would be perceived before pronounciation, because [being admitted to be a quality of the all-pervading Ether,] it is actually in contact with the organ of hearing. And there is here no obstacle [to its being heard, if it existed]; so he says 'any veil,' &c. :—because 'we do not perceive,' i. e., we are certain of the non-existence of, any 'veil' &c., as an obstruction,†

b. But since Sound has no limits, its going [from one place] to another place is not possible;‡ [—so that its not being perceived, while yet existing, is not to be explained on such a supposition].

c. The hypothesis that Sound is not eternal is decidedly simple in comparison with the hypothesis of there being innumerable imperceptible hinderers [of its being perceived at all times]:—such is the import.§

* नचोक्तहेतूनामप्रयोजकत्वं विपक्षबाधकसत्त्वादित्याह ॥

† शब्दो यदि नित्यः स्यादुच्चारणात् प्रागुपलभ्येत ओत्र-
सन्निकर्षसत्त्वात् नचात्र प्रतिबन्धकमस्तीत्याह आवरणेति ।
आवरणादेः प्रतिबन्धकस्यानुपलब्ध्या ऽभावाविर्णयात् ॥

‡ देशान्तरगमनन्तु शब्दस्यामूर्तत्वान्न सम्भाव्यते ॥

§ अतीन्द्रियानन्तप्रतिबन्धकत्वकल्पनामपेक्ष्य शब्दानि-
त्यत्वकल्पनैव लघीयसीति भावः ॥

d. A couple of aphorisms, having reference to the *primâ facie* view of some mistaken person.*

तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादावरणोपलब्धिः ॥ ८७ ॥

A futile suggestion. Aph. 87.—[Perhaps some one will say,] we do perceive the veil [by which Sound is hidden], because we do *not* perceive the *non*-perception thereof [spoken of in §86].

a. It is not made out, by the non-perception thereof, that there is no veil, just as non-perception actually exists notwithstanding the non-perception [of that non-perception]. Just as you allege that, because of the non-perception of the veil, it [the veil,] does not exist; so, since that non-perception of the veil is not perceived, there must be the absence of that—[i. e., there must be the absence of the non-perception of the veil, or, in other words, there must be] just the perception of the veil. Or if [you say that,] notwithstanding the non-perception of the non-perception of the veil, the non-perception of the veil does not cease to exist, then also, by the veil's not being perceived, it is not made out that the veil does not exist:—such is the meaning.†

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet ‡

* भ्रान्तस्य पूर्वपक्षपरं सूत्रद्वयम् ॥

† अनुपलम्भादनुपलब्धिसङ्गाववन्नावरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भात् । यथा त्वया आवरणस्यानुपलब्ध्या अभाव इत्युच्यते तथा आवरणानुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भात् तदभाव आवरणोपलब्धिरेव स्यात् । यदि वा आवरणानुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भेऽपि नावरणानुपलब्धेरभावस्तदा आवरणस्यानुपलम्भादपि नावरणस्यानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ८८ ॥

Its refutation. Aph. 88.—This is no reason, because the non-perception *consists* of non-perception.

a. To say that the veil is perceived, because the non-perception of the veil is not perceived, is a futile answer,—‘no reason,’—i. e., no means of setting aside my opinion;—because ‘the non-perception,’ i. e., the non-perception of any veil, ‘*consists* of non-perception,’ i. e., consists of the absence of perception;—and since this [want of perception of anything] is readily apprehended by the mind itself, the non-perception thereof [—i. e., the non-perception of the want of perception—] is nothing real :—such is the import.*

b. He ponders the doubt whether it be not a case of equally balanced arguments.†

अस्पर्शत्वात् ॥ ८९ ॥

Another doubt, in favour of the eternity of Sound.

Aph. 89.—Because it is intangible.

a. That is to say [—suggests some one—], Sound is eternal, because it is intangible, like the Ether‡ [or Space].

b. It is not a case of equally balanced arguments, because your argument is indeterminate ;—so he says.§—

* आवरणानुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादावरणोपलब्धिरिति जात्युत्तरं अहेतुः । न मन्मतप्रतिषेधसाधनं । अनुपलब्धेरावरणानुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादुपलम्भाभावात्मकत्वात् तस्य च मनसैव सुग्रहत्वात् तदनुपलब्धिरसिद्धेति भावः ॥

† सत्प्रतिपक्षमाशङ्कते ॥

‡ शब्दो नित्यः अस्पर्शत्वाद्गगनवदिति भावः ॥

§ न सत्प्रतिपक्षस्त्वदीयहेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वादित्याह ॥

न कर्मानित्यत्वात् ॥ ६० ॥

Its refutation. Aph. 90.—Nay, because Action is not eternal
[—although intangible].

a. Intangibility does not establish the eternity of Sound, because, in the case of Action, it [viz. intangibility,] presents itself straying away* [unaccompanied by eternalness].

b. [But some one perhaps may say,] even what is indeterminate may still prove [the point] ; so in regard to this he says.†

नाणुनित्यत्वात् ॥ ६१ ॥

A plea in demur rejected.

Aph. 91.—Nay, because an Atom is eternal, [but might be proved otherwise if we were to admit this].

a. Were what is indeterminate allowed to prove anything, then an Atom, i. e., an indivisible part, would not be eternal ;—because we should then find arguments, for its uneternalness, in its possessing Colour, &c., [which stand in the same category with Intangibility] :—such is the meaning.‡

b. He ponders a doubt.§

सम्प्रदानात् ॥ ६२ ॥

Another doubt, in favour of the eternity of Sound.

Aph. 92.—By reason of traditionary teaching, [suggests some one, Sound must be eternal].

* अस्पर्शत्वं न शब्दनित्यत्वसाधकं कर्मणि व्यभिचारात् ॥

† अनैकान्तिकमपि साधकं स्यादत्राह ॥

‡ अनैकान्तिकस्य साधकत्वेऽणोः परमाणोर्नित्यत्वं न स्याद् रूपवत्त्वादिना तत्रानित्यत्वानुमानापत्तेरित्यर्थः ॥

§ शङ्कते ॥

a. By reason, i. e., of the handing down of knowledge by the preceptor to the disciple ;—and thus the antecedent existence of Sound [—or of the words in which the knowledge is conveyed—] is proved ;—and so its eternity is proved by the sense of the terms [or self-evidently], according to the maxim “The thing has been permanent for so long,—and who, afterwards, will not acknowledge this [as having been eternally thus]?” Such is the import.*

b. An aphorism conveying a tenet.†

तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ९३ ॥

Its refutation. *Aph.* 93.—This is no reason, because it is not perceived in the interval.

a. The disciple being seated near him, the preceptor lectures him ; and, if Sound were eternal, then, immediately on the arrival of the disciple, even before the lecture, sound would be perceived ;—so, as it is not perceived, there is no sound [antecedently to utterance] : hence what you have alleged [in §92,] is no reason.‡

b. An aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.§

* गुरुणा शिष्याय विद्यायाः सम्प्रदानात् तथाच शब्दस्य प्राक् सत्त्वं सिद्धं तथाच तावत्कालं स्थिरं चैनं कः पश्चान्नाभ्यसिष्यतीति न्यायान्नित्यत्वमर्थसिद्धमिति भावः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ शिष्ये उपसन्ने गुरुरध्यापयति यदिच शब्दो नित्यः स्यात् तदा शिष्यागमनानन्तरमध्यापनात् पूर्वमपि शब्द उपलभ्येतेत्यनुपलब्ध्याच नास्ति शब्द इत्यतस्त्वदुक्तो न हेतुः ॥

§ पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ॥

अध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६४ ॥

*The objection
reiterated.*

Aph. 94.—You are not to set aside [my argument, —says the objector—], because there is the lecture.

a. That is to say,—the setting aside of my argument is not right ;—why ?—‘because there is the lecture’ :—if, during the intermediate time, sound [or the words to be employed in the lecture,] did not exist, how could the lecture take place ? But the non-perception of sound is accounted for by the absence of its manifesters, in the shape of the concussions of the throat, the palate, &c.,* [as the non-perception of a jar is accounted for by the absence of a lamp or other light to reveal it].

b. An aphorism conveying a tenet.†

उभयोः पक्षयोरन्यतरस्याध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६५ ॥

Its further refutation.

Aph. 95.—One or other of the two alternatives is not set aside by [that argument of] the lecture.

a. Supply as follows :—the objection, against one or other alternative demonstrating the non-eternity of Sound, which is drawn from the ‘lecture,’ does not hold ;—because the fact of the ‘lecture’ is common to both alternatives, [which are the contradictories of one another ;—so that, being no peculiarity of either, it must needs be irrespective of what is to be proved by either the one or the other]. For a lecture consists in pronouncing after the pronunciation of the preceptor, or in pronounci-

* मदीयहेतोः प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः । कुतः । अध्यापनात् । यद्यन्तरालकाले शब्दो न स्यात् कथमध्यापनं घटेत । अनुपलब्धिस्तु शब्दस्य कण्ठतालवाद्यभिघातरूपव्यञ्जकाभावादुपपद्यते इति भावः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

ation conducive to the pupil's pronunciation ;—and this, which is the case alike on the alternative of the permanency or the non-permanency [of Sound], can furnish no corroboration of the eternity of Sound. For a lecture is not a *bestowal* [of the language employed], so that, with an eye to the relinquishment of one's own property in it, and the making over of it to another, its *permanency* need be contemplated :—nor is the thing *possible*, —for it is a contradiction that a thing should simultaneously be the property of many, and one cannot make over the property of another ;—but it is just a case of *direction*, as in the case, e. g., of teaching to dance, [—where you will scarcely contend that the pirouettes, taught to the pupil, had a persistent previous existence] :—such is the import.*

b. An aphorism conveying a *primâ facie* view.†

अभ्यासात् ॥ ९६ ॥

Another objection, in favour
of the eternity of Sound.

Aph. 96.—[Sound must be permanent,
says some one,] because it is dwelt upon.

a. For that which is permanent is perceptively dwelt upon : for

* अन्यतरस्य पक्षस्यानित्यत्वसाधकस्याध्यापनात् यः प्रति-
षेधः स न सम्भवति उभयोः पक्षयोरध्यापनस्य समानत्वा-
दिति शेषः । अध्यापनं हि गुरुच्चारणानूच्चारणं शिष्योच्चा-
रणानुकूलोच्चारणं वा । तच्च स्थैर्यास्थैर्यपक्षयोस्तुल्यं न शब्द-
नित्यतायाः सहायकं विधातुमलं । न ह्यध्यापनं दानं येन
स्वस्वत्वध्वंसपरस्वत्वापादनार्थं तस्य स्थैर्यमाशङ्कनीयं । न वा
सम्भवति बहूनामेकदा स्वत्वविरोधात् परस्वत्वापादनासम्भ-
वाच्च । अपितु नृत्याध्यापनादाविवोपदेशमात्रमिति भावः ॥

† पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ॥

example, one looks ten times at some colour [which is a persistent thing];—in like manner, one recites a chapter [of the Veda] a hundred times;—so that, ‘because it is dwelt upon,’ Sound is permanent:—such is the import.*

b. He replies.†

अन्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासस्योपचारात् ॥ ६७ ॥

Its refutation. Aph. 97.—[Nay,] because even were they other [or numerically different], the dwelling upon them might take place.

a. The primâ facie view is not right:—why? ;—because ‘even were they other,’ i. e., even were the words [numerically] different, the dwelling upon the lecture ‘might take place,’ i. e., were possible. For a ‘dwelling upon’ [or repetition] does not establish persistency,—for we see a ‘dwelling upon’ the thing [or a practice of it,] even where there is a [numerical] difference, in such cases as “He sacrifices twice,” “He dances thrice”, &c.:—such is the import.‡

b. An indifferent person here proposes the doubt how there

* यद्वि स्थिरं तदभ्यस्यमानं दृष्टं । यथा दशकृत्वो रूपं पश्यति । एवं शतकृत्वो ऽनुवाकमधीत इत्यभ्यासात् स्थैर्यं शब्दस्येति भावः ॥

† उत्तरयति ॥

‡ पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः । कुतः । अन्यत्वे भेदेऽपि शब्दानां अध्यापनाभ्यासस्य उपचारात् सम्भवात् । न ह्यभ्यासः स्थैर्यं साधयति द्विर्जुहोति त्रिर्नृत्यतीत्यादौ भेदेऽप्यभ्यासदर्शनादिति भावः ॥

can be 'practice even when there is difference,' seeing that there is really no such thing as difference [or 'otherness'] in the world.*

अन्यदन्यस्मादनन्यत्वादनन्यदित्यन्यताभावः ॥ ९८ ॥

Whether there be such a thing as 'otherness.'

Aph. 98.—There is no such thing [says some one,] as 'otherness,' because what is [called] other than some other, is *not* other, because of its not being other [than itself].

a. That which is *called* other than something else, is *not* other than *itself*;—so how is it *other*,—since it is a contradiction to be both other and not other? Such is the import. The heart [or essential point in this argument,] is this, that it is impossible for a thing to be *other than itself*;† [and if it can, with truth, be said that a thing is 'not other,' how can it be said, with truth, that it is 'other' ?]

b. He clears up this.‡

तदभावे नात्यनन्यता तयोरितरेतरापेक्षसिद्धेः ॥ ९९ ॥

'Otherness' is relative.

Aph. 99.—Though this [—viz., otherness,] may be absent [in the relation of a thing to itself], it is not the case that there is no [such thing as] otherness, because these two [—viz., otherness and identity,] exist with reference to one another.

* अन्यतैव जगति नास्तीति कथमन्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासेपपत्तिरिति तटस्थ आशङ्कते ॥

† यदन्यस्मादनन्यदुच्यते तत् स्वस्मादनन्यदभिन्नं । तत् कथमन्यद्वेदाभेदयोर्विरोधादिति भावः । स्वाभेदस्यावश्यकत्वमिति हृदयम् ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

a. 'Though this may be absent,' i. e., though otherness may be absent, it is not further the case that there is *no* otherness; because 'these two,' i. e., otherness and identity, exist through mutual reference to one another; because, in reality, either, i. e., any one of two,—e. g., identity,—exists in respect of the other [e. g., in respect of otherness], because it [viz., identity,] is such that it exists with reference to the knowledge of otherness, i. e., of [numerical] difference [—the word *same* having no meaning to him who does not understand the word *other*]:—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः ॥ १०० ॥

Another objection in favour of the eternity of Sound.

Aph. 100.—[Sound, says some one, must be eternal,] because we discern no cause why it should perish.

a. [For the reason alleged,] sound is eternal, &c. Non-discernment means either absence of perception, or absence of knowledge,‡ [such, e. g., as might come by inference;—see §102, a].

b. In the first place he states what debars this.§

अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः ॥ १०१ ॥

* तदभावे ऽन्यत्वस्याभावे ऽनन्यतापि नास्ति तयोर्भेदा-
भेदयोः सिद्धेः परस्परसापेक्षत्वात् । वस्तुतस्तु तयोर्मध्य इत-
रस्य एकतरस्य अनन्यत्वस्य इतरापेक्षसिद्धेः इतरत्वस्य
भेदस्य ज्ञानापेक्षा सिद्धिर्यस्य तादृशत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ शब्दे नित्य इत्यादिः । अनुपलब्धिरप्रत्यक्षमज्ञानं वा ॥

§ आद्ये प्रतिबन्धिमाह ॥

The argument proves too much.

Aph. 101.—[Were non-perception sufficient to prove non-existence,] we should have constant audition, because of our not perceiving any cause why we should not hear.

a. If non-existence were established by non-perception, then, as we perceive no cause of our not hearing, we should not cease to hear;—that is to say, we should find that there is hearing constantly.*

b. But, in the second place, he says.†

उपलभ्यमाने चानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादनपदेशः ॥ १०२ ॥

The argument refuted otherwise.

Aph. 102.—And, since the non-perception is not a fact, inasmuch as it [viz., the cause of the cessation of hearing,] is discerned, this [argument of yours] proves nothing.

a. The cause of the cessation being gathered by inference, &c., since there is *not* non-perception of it, your reason 'proves nothing,'—i. e., does not establish,—because it is itself unsound. The fact is, that we conjecture the perishableness [of Sound] from the fact of its being a product.‡

b. Another aphorism of the author of the tenets.§

* यद्यप्रत्यक्षत्वादभावसिद्धिस्तदाश्रवणकारणस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वादश्रवणं न स्यादिति सततश्रवणप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः ॥

† द्वितीये त्वाह ॥

‡ अनुमानादिना उपलभ्यमाने विनाशकारणे अनुपलब्धेरभावात् त्वदीयो हेतुरनपदेशः असाधकः असिद्धत्वात् । जन्यभावत्वेन विनाशकल्पनमिति भावः ॥

§ सिद्धान्तिनः सूत्रान्तरम् ॥

पाणिनिमित्तप्रक्षेपाच्छब्दाभावे नानुपलब्धिः ॥ १०३ ॥

One cause of the cessation of Sound.

Aph. 103.—There is not non-perception [of the cause of the cessation of Sound], sound ceasing on the application of such a cause as the hand.

a. When a gong, or the like, is sounding, since the cessation of sound is perceived 'on the application,' i. e., on the contact, of a cause—in the shape of the hand, there is *not* a non-perception of any cause of the cessation of Sound.*

b. But then, since the contact of the hand with a bell or the like, stops the sound, [some one may say] the sound must really reside in the bell, or the like, [and not in that imaginary substratum of Sound, the Ether]; so, in reference to this doubt, he says :†—

अस्पर्शत्वादप्रतिषेधः ॥ १०४ ॥

The substratum of Sound intangible.

Aph. 104.—This objection will not hold, because it [the ethereal substratum of Sound,] is intangible.

a. Complete thus :—the alleged objection does not hold, because the substratum of Sound is intangible [and cannot therefore be the tangible bell, or the like]. For Sound is not a distinguishing quality of what things possess tangibility,—for it is not a product following from any such quality in its [substantial

* शब्दायमाने कांस्यादौ पाणिरूपनिमित्तस्य प्रक्षेपात् संयोगाच्छब्दाभावे उपलभ्यमाने शब्दाभावकारणस्य नानुपलब्धिरिति ॥

† ननु घण्टादिपाणिसंयोगस्य शब्दनिवर्त्तकत्वे घण्टाद्या-
अय एव शब्दः स्यादित्याशङ्कयामाह ॥

cause], not being the result [e. g.,] of contact with fire as the non substantial cause:—such is the drift.* [To explain;—if we suppose the tangible bell to be the substantial cause of Sound, then the non-substantial cause is that contact of something with the bell, which elicits the Sound:—but then *fire* is tangible, no less than a bell; yet contact with fire does not produce Sound.]

b. In order to explain this same point, he says:†—

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेश्च समासे ॥ १०५ ॥

A peculiarity of Sound. Aph. 105.—And [Sound is not one] in an assemblage [of qualities belonging to some tangible substratum], because there really are various divisions [of Sound apparently belonging to the same object].

a. It is not proper to say, that, ‘in an assemblage,’ i. e., in a compound of tangibility and other [properties], Sound exists in combination,—‘because there really are various divisions,’ i. e., several varieties of acute and grave, &c. The meaning is this;—in one single conch-shell, or the like, various sounds, acute, grave, &c., are produced; but [we do not observe anything of this kind in the case of what are really qualities of the shell, or the like; for] Odours &c. do not alter without contact with fire, [whereas the Sound alters without any alteration of the shell]:—such is the import.‡

* उक्तः प्रतिषेधो न सम्भवति अस्पर्शत्वात् शब्दाश्रय-
स्येति शेषः । शब्दो हि न स्पर्शवद्विशेषगुणः अग्निसंयोगा-
समवायिकारणकत्वाभाववदकारणगुणपूर्वककार्यत्वादित्या-
शयः ॥

† एतदेव व्युत्पादयितुमाह ॥

‡ समासे स्पर्शादिसमुदाये साहित्येन शब्दो वर्त्तत इति

b. Here ends the section on the non-eternity of Sound.*

c. Since this is its appropriate place, in order to censure the opinion that Sound changes, he displays a doubt.†

SECTION XII.

ON THE CHANGES OF SOUNDS.

विकारापदेशोपदेशात् संशयः ॥ १० ई ॥

Whether letters change. Aph. 106.—From the injunction under the character of a change, there arises a doubt.

a. Some explain, that, by the rule [P. VI., 1, 77,] “Instead of the vowel *i*, &c., when a vowel follows, let there be a semivowel,” &c., it is meant that the letter *y*, &c., is a modification of the letter *i*, &c. But others explain the direction thus, that, whereas an *i* was to be employed, a *y* is to be employed [instead]. And hence arises the doubt whether letters are changeable or not.‡

न युक्तं विभक्त्यन्तरस्य विभागान्तरस्य तारमन्दादेरुपपत्तेः ।
अयमर्थः । एकस्मिन्नेव शब्दादौ तारमन्दादिनानाशब्दा
जायन्ते गम्भादयस्तु विनाग्निसंयोगं न परावर्तन्त इति
भावः ॥

* समाप्तं शब्दानित्यत्वप्रकरणम् ।

† प्रसङ्गाच्छब्दपरिणामवादं दूषयितुं संशयं प्रदर्शयति ॥

‡ इको यस्मचीत्यादिना इकारादेर्विकारो यकारादि-
रिति केचित् व्याचक्षते । परे तु इकारे प्रयोक्तव्ये यकारः

b. And by change is meant the origination of another substance, whether with destruction or without destruction of nature [in that from which it originates], as the origination of curds, &c. from milk, &c. and the origination of a tree, &c. from a seed, &c. Moreover, even when there has been the destruction of a mass, e. g., of gold, through the destruction of the union of its parts by the blows of a hammer, there originates a bracelet; while a jar, or the like, originates *without* the destruction of the nature of the bowl-shaped halves &c.,* [which are put together to form it].

c. An aphorism to set aside [the theory of] a change in this case.†

प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ विकारविवृद्धेऽपि ॥ १०७ ॥

*An argument against
change of letters.*

Aph. 107.—And, by reason of increased bulk in the original, there would be increased bulk in the modification.

a. Letters are not changeable; for, were such the case, we should find increased bulk in the modification, in accordance with increase of bulk in its original, i. e., in that which is re-

प्रयोक्तव्य इत्यादेशमादिशन्ति । अतश्च वर्णा विकारिणो
न वेति संशयः ॥

* विकारश्च स्वरूपस्य विनाशेऽविनाशे वा द्रव्यान्तरारम्भ-
कत्वं यथा दुग्धादेर्दध्यादारम्भकत्वं बीजादेर्वृक्षादारम्भक-
त्वञ्च । सुवर्णादेरपि लौहाघातजन्यावयवसंयोगनाशाद-
वयविनो नाशे सत्येव कुण्डलारम्भः कपालादेश्च स्वरूपा-
विनाशेन घटादारम्भकत्वम् ॥

† तत्र विकारनिराकरणाय सूत्रम् ॥

garded as its material,—just as largeness or smallness belongs to that mass which originates from [aliquot] parts, large or small. That is to say,—in comparison with the letter *y* which originated from a short letter *i*, the letter *y* which originated from a long letter *ī* should be greater:—therefore the side [of the argument which advocates the theory] of substitution is the better:—such is the import.*

b. Some one objects.†

न्यूनसमाधिकोपपत्तेर्विकाराणामहेतुः ॥ १०८ ॥

Objection to the foregoing argument.

Aph. 108.—This [says some one,] is no reason, for we find modifications less than, equal to, and greater than [the original material].

a. The alleged argument is not right, because ‘we find,’ i. e., we see, that modifications are smaller, equal, and greater, in comparison of the original material;—as, in comparison with the bulk of the cotton, the thread formed of it is of small bulk; or as, from a cocoa-nut, which is larger than the seed of a Banian-tree [or *Ficus Indica*], a cocoa-nut-tree, smaller than a Banian-tree, is produced,—and a bracelet or the like, equal in bulk to the gold or the like; or as, from two cocoanuts, smaller and larger, two equal trees; or from two seeds of the Banian-tree,

* न वर्णा विकारिणस्तथा सति तत्प्रकृतेरुपादानत्वाभिमतस्य विवृद्धा विकारस्यापि विवृद्धापत्तेः महदल्पावयवार-
भावयविनो महदल्पत्ववत् । ह्रस्वेकारारब्धयकारापेक्षया
दीर्घेकारारब्धयकारस्य विवृद्धिः स्यादित्यर्थः । तस्मादादे-
शपक्षः श्रेयानिति भावः ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

smaller and larger, two equal trees; and, from the seed of a Banian-tree, small in bulk, a large Banian-tree.*

b. He clears up this.†

नातुल्यप्रकृतीनां विकारविकल्पात् ॥ १०६ ॥

*The objection
disposed of.*

Aph. 109.—Nay,—because it was the difference of the products whose original material is unequal [that *I* spoke of].

a. The foregoing decision is not right, because what *I* spoke of was the 'difference,' i. e., the discrepancy of those products 'whose original material is unequal,' i. e., whose original material is different. For the smallness or greatness, &c., of a tree or the like, does not proceed from the smallness or greatness, &c., of the seed or the like; but, moreover, there is, in this case, an entire difference from that which *I* spoke of [—which was not a seminal principle, but a mass to be operated upon—]; and so thy remark is a fallacy through a figure of speech:—such is the import.‡

* उक्तो हेतुर्न युक्तः विकाराणां प्रकृत्यपेक्षया न्यूनत्वस्य समत्वस्याधिकत्वस्य चोपपत्तेर्दर्शनात् । यथा तूलकपरिमाणापेक्षया तद्विकारस्तन्तुरल्पपरिमाणः । यथा वा न्यग्रोधबीजादुत्कृष्टेन नारिकेलीबीजेन न्यग्रोधादल्पो नारिकेली-तरुर्जन्यते कनकादिसमपरिमाणं कटकादिच । यथा वा न्यूनाधिकनारिकेलीबीजाभ्यां समौ वृक्षौ न्यूनाधिकपरिमाणवटबीजाभ्यां समौ वृक्षौ न्यूनपरिमाणाच्च वटबीजात् महान् वटतरुरिति ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ नेत्तं समाधानं युक्तं । अतुल्यप्रकृतीनां भिन्नप्रकृती-

b. He ponders a doubt.*

द्रव्यविकारवैषम्यवद्वर्णविकाराविकल्पः ॥ ११० ॥

Whether the changes of different letters may not be the same.

Aph. 110.—There may be no difference in the modifications of [different] letters, just as [conversely,] there may be difference in the modifications of substances.

a. As there is an inequality in the products, though, so far forth as it is substance, there be equality in the original material, of Banian-fig-trees &c.; just so [conversely,] there is nothing unaccountable in there being 'no difference,' i. e., an identity of form, in the letter Y, which is the modification whether of a long or of a short [vowel]:—such is the meaning.†

b. He clears this up.‡

न विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः ॥ १११ ॥

The foregoing suggestion not in point.

Aph. 111.—Nay, for the character of a modification does not exist [in this case].

नां हि विकाराणां विकल्पः वैलक्षण्यं मयाभिहितं । न हि
बोजादेर्ह्रासवृद्ध्यादिना वृद्धादेर्ह्रासवृद्ध्यादिकं प्रक्रान्तं मदुक्त-
वैलक्षण्यन्तु तत्राप्यस्ति तथाच त्वदुक्तमुपचारच्छलमिति
भावः ॥

* शङ्कते ॥

† द्रव्यत्वेन न्यग्राधादिप्रकृतीनां तुल्यत्वेऽपि विकारवै-
षम्यं यथा एवमेव वर्णत्वेन तुल्ययोरपि ह्रस्वदीर्घयोर्यो
विकारो यकारस्तस्य अविकल्प ऐकरूप्यं नानुपपन्नमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

a. There is not, in this case, a resemblance to the modifications of substances; for this is the character of [what are really] modifications, viz., that they follow their original; so that, where this is different, they are different: and this does not present itself in the present instance,—seeing that there is no difference in the result, [viz., the semivowel,] although the original [vowel] differed in being long or short, &c.*

b. And hence it is not a change [of one letter into another];—so he says.†

विकारप्राप्तानामपुनरावृत्तेः ॥ ११२ ॥

How it cannot be that letters change.

Aph. 112.—Because what things have undergone a change do not again return [to their original form].

a. The original form of what has undergone a change is not seen again. Curds, verily, do not attain again the state of milk; but the letter *i*, having reached the condition of the letter *y*, does again reach the condition of the letter *i*:—for, when one has said “curds here” (*dadhyatra*), still again one does say [—with a return to the original unchanged vowel—] “curds here” (*dadhi+atra*):—such is the import.‡

* नात्र द्रव्यविकारतुल्यता । विकाराणां हि अयं धर्मो यत्प्रकृत्यनुविधानं तद्भेदे भेद इति प्रकृते तदनुपपत्तिः । द्रुत्वदीर्घत्वादिना प्रकृतिभेदेऽपि कार्यभेदाभावात् ॥

† इतश्च न विकार इत्याह ॥

‡ विकारप्राप्तस्य न पुनः प्रकृतिरूपता दृष्टा । न खलु दधि क्षीरतां पुनरापद्यते । इकारस्तु यकारतां प्राप्तः पुनरिकारतामापद्यते दध्यन्नेत्युक्त्वा पुनरपि दधि अन्नेत्युच्यत एवेति भावः ॥

b. Some one throws out an objection.*

सुवर्णादीनां पुनरापत्तेरहेतुः ॥ ११३ ॥

An objection to the preceding argument.

Aph. 113.—This [says some one,] is no reason, because [ornaments of] gold &c. do appear again [as before].

a. The foregoing argument [says some one,] is not right; because gold or the like, having left the condition of a bracelet, and having assumed that of a ring, again *does* assume the condition of a bracelet :—such is the import.†

b. He repels‡ [this objection].

न तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ११४ ॥

The objection repelled.

Aph. 114.—Nay, because its modifications do not relinquish the nature of gold.

a. For, in the case of the modifications of gold, it is through its nature as *gold* &c., that it serves as a material, but not through its nature as a *bracelet* or the like. In that instance, [of the golden bracelet's becoming a ring, and that again becoming a bracelet,] neither of them relinquishes the nature of gold. For if, having relinquished the nature of gold, it had attained the nature of a bracelet, and the nature of gold had come back again, *then* [but not otherwise,] there might have been a fallacy [in my argument, such as you charge upon it]. And it is not the same with the case in hand :—that which, having relinquished the character of the letter *i*, had even attained the character

* आक्षिपति ॥

† उक्तो हेतुर्न युक्तः सुवर्णादिकं हि कटकीभावं विहाय कुण्डलतामापन्नं पुनः कटकतामापद्यत एवेति भावः ॥

‡ निराकरोति ॥

of the letter *y*, really does resume the character of the letter *i*; —which is an objection [to the appositeness of your instance,] that you will hardly get over :—such is the import.*

b. He states the fundamental argument for there being no change† [of letters].

नित्यत्वे ऽविकारादनित्यत्वेचानवस्थानात् ॥ ११५ ॥

The theory, that letters change, reduced to a dilemma.

Aph. 115.—Because, if it [viz., an alphabetical sound,] be eternal, it cannot change; and, if it be not eternal, then it does not abide [long enough to furnish the material for a change].

a. Since letters, if eternal, are incapable of change, and since, if they be not eternal, immediately after the perception of the letter *i*, from its abiding for no length of time, the letter *i* perishes, there can be no such thing as a change [of the *i* to *y*] :—such is the meaning.‡

b. To this the assertor of change, founding on the opinion of the eternity [of letters], objects.§

* सुवर्णविकारस्थले हि सुवर्णत्वादिना प्रकृतिता न तु कटकत्वादिना । तत्रोभयमपि सुवर्णभावं न जहाति । यदि हि सुवर्णतामपह्नाय कटकतामापन्नं पुनः सुवर्णता तदा व्यभिचारः शक्येत । नचैवं प्रकृते । इकारतां हित्वा यकारतां प्राप्तस्थापीकारतापत्तिरस्येवेति दोषो दुःपरिहर इति भावः ॥

† अविकारे मूलयुक्तिमाह ॥

‡ वर्णानां नित्यत्वे विकारासम्भवादनित्यत्वेचाचिरस्थायित्वेनेकारप्रत्यक्षानन्तरमिकारनाशाद्विकारानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

§ अत्र विकारवादी नित्यत्वमतमालम्ब्य परिहरति ॥

नित्यानामतीन्द्रियत्वाद्धर्मविकल्पाच्च वर्णविकाराणाम-

प्रतिषेधः ॥ ११६ ॥

*An attempt to meet one
horn of the dilemma.*

Aph. 116.—Since [some] eternal things are beyond the grasp of the senses, and since there is a difference of character, [in others,] the changes of letters [—argues some one—] are not to be denied.

a. The denial of the changes is not proper ; because eternal things have a ‘difference of character,’ i. e., the characters are of several sorts ; because some are ‘beyond the grasp of the senses.’ By the “and” the fact that some *are* cognizable by sense is included. For, as, although such eternal things as the Ether are beyond the grasp of sense, the nature of a cow &c. is eternal [and perceptible] ; so, too, though other eternal things be unchangeable, *letters* may be susceptible of change.*

b. Founding on the non-eternity [of letters], he [the same objector,] says :—†

अनवस्थायित्वेच वर्णोपलब्धिवत्तदुपपत्तिः ॥ ११७ ॥

*An attempt to face the se-
cond horn of the dilemma.*

Aph. 117.—And, though they be unper-
manent, yet, as there is the perception of
letters, this [change of them also] is possible.

a. Though letters be unpermanent, yet, as the perception of

* विकाराणां प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः नित्यानां धर्मविकल्पा-
द्धर्मस्य नानाविधत्वादतीन्द्रियत्वात् चकारेणैन्द्रियकत्वं समु-
चीयते । यथा हि नित्यानामाकाशादीनामतीन्द्रियत्वेऽपि
गोत्वादीनां नित्यत्वमेवमन्येषां नित्यानामविकारित्वेऽपि
वर्णानां विकारित्वं स्यादिति ॥

† अनित्यत्वमालम्ब्य स आह ॥

them takes place, so also a change of them [—as from *i* to *y*—] may take place :—such is the import.*

b. He replies to both† [of these attempts to save the credit of the objection].

विकारधर्मित्वे नित्यत्वाभावात् कालान्तरे विकारोप-
पत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ११८ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 118.—The objection will not do, because eternalness is not where there is that which has the character of a modification, and because the modification [—if we are to call it so—] presents itself at a subsequent time [to the destruction of the alleged material].

a. The alleged objection is not proper, because it is impossible that there should be eternalness where the case is one of what has the character of a modification ;—for modification here means the assumption of another nature, with abandonment of one's own nature ;—and because, when such is the state of things, there is the reverse of being eternal. For, in the instance in question, it cannot be as when bowl-shaped halves or the like constitute the materials of a jar or the like ;—because, during the time of the letter *y*, there is no perception of the letter *i*, [—whereas, during the existence of the jar, its constitutive bowl-shaped halves are equally patent]. On the alternative also of non-eternity, [in alphabetic sounds,] the objection is not proper ; for the perception of the letter, at the second instant, [—the antecedent first instant being that of its presentation to the sense —] is feasible, but its modification, belonging to a subsequent time, is not feasible ;—because, immediately after the sound of *dadhi* ('milk'), it is [on the hypothesis,] annihilated by, e. g., the

* अनवस्थायित्वे ऽपि वर्णानां यथा प्रत्यक्षं भवत्येवं विकारो ऽपि स्यादिति भावः ॥

† उभयत्रोत्तरयति ॥

sound of *atra* ('here');—such is the import,* [—so that *dadhyatra* cannot be a modification of *dadhi* + *atra*].

b. And he states how there cannot be a change [in the case of letters,] for the following reason.†

प्रकृत्यनियमात् ॥ ११६ ॥

An argument against there being change of letters.

Aph. 119.—Because there is no fixed rule as regards the original material.

a. For, in the case of [what really are] modifications, there is a fixed rule as regards the original material. For example, milk and curd have the fixed relation of material and modification, but not conversely; but, in the instance in question, the letter *i* is the original of the letter *y* in *dadhyatra* ('curd here'), &c.; but in *vidhyati* ('he wounds,') &c., the letter *y* (e. g., of the root *vyadh*,) is the original of the letter *i*:—such is the import.‡

* उक्तः प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः विकारधर्मित्वे नित्यत्वासम्भवात् । विकारो ह्यत्र स्वरूपपरित्यागेन रूपान्तरापत्तिः तथात्वेच नित्यत्वविरोधात् । न हि घटादेः कपालाद्युपादेयत्ववत् प्रकृते सम्भवति यकारकाले इकारानुपलब्धेः । अनित्यत्वपक्षेऽपि प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः प्रत्यक्षं हि वर्णस्य द्वितीयक्षणे युज्यते विकारस्तु कालान्तरीयो न युज्यते दधीति शब्दानन्तरमत्रेत्यादिशब्देन तस्य नाशादिति भावः ॥

† इतश्च विकारानुपपत्तिरित्याह ॥

‡ विकाराणां हि प्रकृतिनियमो यथा क्षीरदध्नाः प्रकृतिविकारभावो न तु वैपरीत्यं । प्रकृते तु दध्यत्रेत्यादाविकारो यकारप्रकृतिर्विध्यतीत्यादौ तु यकार इकारप्रकृतिरिति भावः ॥

b. In respect to this, a sophist expresses a doubt.*

अनियमे नियमान्नानियमः ॥ १२० ॥

A quibble.

Aph. 120.—There is no want [says some one,] of a fixed rule, because the fixed rule consists in there being no fixed rule.

a. That is to say, that absence of a fixed rule, which is alleged [in §119], is not right ;—why ? ;—because it is fixed that there shall be nothing fixed.†

b. He clears up this.‡

नियमानियमविरोधादनियमे नियमाच्चाप्रति-

षेधः ॥ १२१ ॥

The quibble disposed of.

Aph. 121.—And this is not to be set aside by saying that the fixed rule consists in there being no fixed rule ; because a fixed rule and the absence of a fixed rule are contradictories.

a. The objection made by thee to the absence of a fixed rule where there is no fixed rule, is not right ;—‘because a fixed rule and the absence of a fixed rule are contradictories’ ;—for the absence of a fixed rule is the non-existence of a fixed rule, and when there is this, it is impossible there should be a fixed rule :—such is the import.§

* अत्रच्छलवादी शङ्कते ॥

† अनियमो य उक्तः स न युक्तः । कुतः । अनियतत्वस्य नियमादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ अनियमे यस्त्वयानियमप्रतिषेधः कृतः स न युक्तः ।

b. Having thus, then, rejected the opinion that letters stand in the relation of original material and modification, he justifies the employment, on his own side, of [the term] change* [as applied to letters].

गुणान्तरापत्त्युपमर्दद्वासृष्टिलेशस्त्रेवेभ्यस्तु वर्णविकारोपपत्तेर्वर्णविकारः ॥ १२२ ॥

Senses in which the term change of letters may be employed.

Aph. 122.—But there is [what may allowably be called] change of

letters, because such change of letters does occur through the attainment of another quality, substitution, abbreviation, prolongation, contraction, and augmentation.

a. The word 'but' here means 'again.' For these [reasons], again, 'since change of letters does occur,' i. e., since there does occur 'a change,' i. e., by the employment of one letter the force of another letter,—the term 'change' is employed† [allowably].

b. He states these same [reasons,]—'other quality,' &c. The 'attainment of another quality,' is the arrival of a different character while the subject really remains,—as when the grave accentuation befalls what was acutely accented. 'Substitution' is the employment of another subject, the [previous] subject

कुतः । नियमानियमयोर्विरोधात् । अनियमो हि नियमाभावस्तस्मिन् सति नियमासम्भवादिति भावः ॥

* तदेवं वर्णानां प्रकृतिविकारभावं निरस्य स्वपक्षे विकारव्यवहारमुपपादयति ॥

† तुशब्दः पुनरर्थः । एतेभ्यः पुनर्वर्णविकारोपपत्तेर्वर्णविकारस्य एकवर्णप्रयोगेण वर्णान्तरप्रयोगस्य उपपत्तेर्वर्णविकार इति व्यवह्रियते ॥

having been set aside,—as *bhú* ('be') for *as* ('be'). 'Abbreviation' is the shortening of a long. 'Prolongation' is the lengthening of a short. 'Contraction' is diminution, as the omission of the letter *a* of *as* ('be'). An 'augment' is an addition. For these reasons the term 'change' [of letters] is employed* [by those who do not allow that one letter turns into another].

c. Here ends the section on the changes of sounds.†

d. Since, of knowledge due to verbal evidence, the cause is the advent of the word-meanings produced by the words, and since, in order to demonstrate this, we must explain in what consists the meaning of a word, he in the first place describes a word.‡

SECTION XIII.

THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FORCE OF A WORD.

ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम् ॥ १२३ ॥

Aph. 123.—These, having an affix at the end, form a word.

* तानेवाह । गुणान्तरेति । गुणान्तरापत्तिर्धर्मिणि सत्त्वेव धर्मान्तरापत्तिः यथोदात्ते ऽनुदात्तत्वं । उपमर्दो धर्मिनिवृत्तौ धर्म्यन्तरप्रयोगः यथास्तेर्भूः । द्वासे दीर्घस्य ह्रस्वत्वं । वृद्धिः ह्रस्वस्य दीर्घत्वं । लेशः अल्पत्वं यथा अस्तेरकारलोपः । श्लेष आगमः । एतैः कारणैर्विकारव्यवहार इति ॥

† समाप्तं शब्दपरिणामप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ शब्दबोधे पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेर्हेतुत्वात् तदुपपादनाय पदार्थे निरूपणीये पदमादौ निरूपयति ॥

a. 'These,' viz., letters, 'having an affix at the end, form a word.' We do not mean to say that there must be a plurality [of letters,—for a word may consist of a duality, or of only one]. And the actual presence of an affix is not [necessarily,] to be looked for, [—a word, logically, if not grammatically, being a word, independently of inflection]. And an affix is an inflection of case or tense, [—see the *Laghu Kaumudī*, §144]. But, in reality, it is not this [bare] word that is conducive to the knowledge due to verbal evidence, but it is this with the nature of 'expectancy,' [i. e., so qualified as to keep the sense in suspense until combined with other words in a sentence:—see *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, §71]. Or [—to explain the expression, in the aphorism, *vibhaktyantah*, differently—], the word rendered 'affix' may mean 'function,' and the word rendered 'ending' may mean 'relation;' so that what is meant by being a word will be the 'possession of a function,'* [—which does not belong to mere arbitrary or accidental aggregates of letters].

b. Having described a word, what its meaning consists in, i. e., what the sense of a word consists in, has been explained [in our commentary]. Moreover, since among these [meanings of words,] there is no dispute as to what is meant by a verbal root, &c., in order to explain the meaning of such a word as "cow," he says.†

तदर्थं व्यक्त्वाकृतिजातिसन्निधावुपचारात् संशयः ॥ १२४ ॥

* ते वर्णा विभक्त्यन्ताः पदं । बहुत्वमविवक्षितं । विभक्तेश्च सत्त्वमनपेक्षितं । विभक्तिश्च सुप्तिङ् रूपा । वस्तुतस्तु नेदं पदं शाब्दबोधोपयोगि किन्त्विदमाकाङ्क्षास्वरूपमथवा विभक्तिर्वृत्तिरन्तः सम्बन्धस्तेन वृत्तिमत्त्वं पदत्वमिति ॥

† तत्र पदे निरूपिते तद्वाच्यत्वं पदार्थत्वं निरूपितं । तत्रापि धात्वाद्यर्थस्य निर्विवादत्वाद्गवादिपदार्थं निरूपयितुमाह ॥

The question what a substantive directly denotes.

Aph. 124.—As to what is meant by it,—since we recognize this in company with individual, form, and genus,—there is doubt.

a. ‘Individual,’ viz, cow, or the like; ‘genus,’ viz., cowhood, or the like; ‘form;’ i. e., any particular collocation of parts;—the ‘company’ of these, i. e., their vicinity, their association where this [association] is; ‘because we recognize,’ i. e., we take note of [the import of this or that word]. And so, since we perceive the three simultaneously, there is the doubt,—pray, are these severally what is meant by the word, or these aggregatively?—such is the meaning.*

b. Some say that this [aphorism] is [a part of the *Bhāshya*]; but, in reality, from its difficult style, &c., it is decidedly an aphorism. Yet the portion “As to what is meant by it” seems to have been supplied by the author of the *Bhāshya*.†

c. In regard to this [doubt as to what is directly designated by a substantive], he states the opinion of him who alleges that the ‘individual’ is what is meant.‡

याशब्दसमूहत्यागपरिग्रहसंख्यावृद्ध्युपचयवर्णसमासा-
नुबन्धानां व्यक्तावुपचाराद्यक्तिः ॥ १२५ ॥

* व्यक्तिर्गवादिः जातिर्गोत्वादिराकृतिरवयवसंस्थान-
विशेषः । तेषां सन्निधिः सामीप्यं मेलनं । तत्र सति । उप-
चारात् ज्ञानात् । तथाच त्रयाणां युगपत् प्रत्ययात् किमेतेषां
प्रत्येकं पदार्थ उत समस्तमिति संशय इत्यर्थः ॥

† इदं भाष्यमिति केचित् । वस्तुतस्तु दुर्बोधादिस्वरसात्
सूत्रमेव । तदर्थ इत्यंशस्तु भाष्यकृतः पूरणमिति प्रति-
भाति ॥

‡ तत्र व्यक्तिशक्तिवादिनो मतमाह ॥

Erroneous opinion that an appellative denotes the individual.

Aph. 125.—[The meaning of the word, says some one, is] the individual, because [only] in respect of an individual can be understood the term “go,” or a collection, or the giving, taking, number, waxing, waning, colour, [grammatical] composition, or birth.

a. Supply ‘is the meaning of the word.’ Because the said things ‘can be understood,’ i. e., can be employed. The word *anubandha* here means birth. ‘Go,’ i. e., such an expression as “The cow goes.” Only ‘in respect of an individual,’—because genus and form are insubstantial,—because thus it is only in respect of an individual that such expressions can be employed as “A collection of cows,” “He gives the cow,” “He accepts the cow,” “Ten cows,” “The cow waxes,” “A lean cow,” “A red cow,” “Cow’s blood,” “The bull born,” &c.*

b. If the word *samāsa* be held to mean “abiding properly,” or “relation,” then the [penultimate] exemplification should be “The cow abides,” or “The cow’s face.”†

c. He condemns this.‡

तदनवस्थानात् ॥ १२६ ॥

* पदार्थ इति शेषः । उक्तानां उपचारात् व्यवहारात् । अनुबन्धः प्रजननं । या गौर्गच्छतीत्यादिव्यवहारः । व्यक्तावेव जात्याकृत्योरमूर्त्तत्वात् । एवं गवां समूहः गां ददाति गां प्रतिगृह्णाति दश गावः गौर्वद्भूते कृशा गौः कपिला गौः गोलोहितं गौः प्रसूत इत्यादिव्यवहाराणां व्यक्तावेव सम्भवात् ॥

† समासः सम्यगासनं सम्बन्धो वेत्यर्थे गौरास्ते गोमुखमित्युदाहरणीयम् ॥

‡ तद्वृषयति ॥

The opinion refuted. Aph. 126.—[An appellative does not denote an individual,] because there is no fixation thereof.

a. The meaning does not pertain to the individual, because there is no 'fixation' of an individual simply,—it is indeterminate.*

b. For, if it were an individual simply [—without reference to the *kind* of individual—] that is meant, then, in consequence of the word "cow," or the like, any individual [of any kind] whatsoever might present itself;—therefore what is meant [by the word "cow"] is [not an individual simply, but] an individual distinguished by cowhood. And so, [some one may ask,] agreeably to the maxim "Cognition which does not apprehend the distinction, cannot infer [the exact nature of] what is to be distinguished," let the meaning apply only to the genus:—how, then, does it acquaint us with an individual? To this the following aphorism† [replies].

सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारणसामीप्ययोगसा-
धनाधिपत्येभ्यो ब्राह्मणमञ्चकटराजसक्तुचन्दनगङ्गा-
शकटान्नपुरुषेष्वतद्भावे ऽपि तदुपचारः ॥ १२७ ॥

Indirect employment of speech. Aph. 127.—Though its meaning be not so and so, it is figuratively so employed, in the case of (1) a Bráhmaṇ, (2) a scaffold, (3) a

* न व्यक्तौ शक्तिर्व्यक्तिमात्रस्यानवस्थानात् अव्यवस्थानात् ॥

† व्यक्तिमात्रस्य शक्यत्वे हि गवादिपदाद्यत्किञ्चिद्व्यक्तेरुपस्थितिः स्यादतो गोत्वविशिष्टा व्यक्तिर्वाचा । तथाच नागृहीतविशेषणान्यायात् जातावेव शक्तिरस्तु कथं तर्हि व्यक्तिबोध इत्यग्रिमसूत्रम् ॥

mat, (4) a king, (5) meal, (6) sandal-wood, (7) the Ganges, (8) a cart, (9) food, and (10) a man,—in consideration of (1) association, (2) place, (3) design, (4) function, (5) measure, (6) containing, (7) vicinity, (8) conjunction, (9) sustenance, and (10) supremacy.

a. 'Though it be not so and so,' i. e., though such be not the direct meaning of the word; 'it is figuratively employed,' i. e., the word is used indirectly; for example, the word "staff" &c. is employed for a Bráhmaṇ &c., because of association &c. In consequence of 'association,' which is a species of conjunction, in this example "Feed the staff," the word staff is employed in the sense of the Bráhmaṇ who bears a staff.*

b. In like manner, from the 'place,' "The scaffolds shout" means the man standing on the scaffold. From the 'design,' "He makes a mat" implies his aiming after a mat; for the mat, inasmuch as it is a thing non-existent [*until* made], can have [—at the time when one is spoken of as making it—] no maker. Because his 'function' is that of Yama, [the judge of the dead], viz., chastising &c., the word Yama is used to mean a king. By reason of the 'measure,' meal measured by a bushel is called a bushel of meal. By reason of the 'containing,' sandal-wood placed in a vessel is called a vessel of sandal-wood. Because of 'vicinity,' they say "The cows are feeding on the Ganges." Because of the conjunction of some black substance [in the shape of paint,] with the cart, the expression "A black cart" may be instanced. Because it is the 'sustenance' of life, food is called life. In the expression "Of course his family is a king," we un-

* अतद्भावे ऽपि तत्पदाशक्यत्वेऽपि तदुपचारः तच्छब्दव्यपदेशो यथा सहचरणादितो ब्राह्मणादौ यस्यादिपदप्रयोगः । सहचरणात् संयोगविशेषाद्यष्टिं भोजयेत्यत्र यष्टिधरब्राह्मणे यष्टिशब्दप्रयोगः ॥

derstand [by family,] the head of the family,—because of the headship* [implied in this elliptical expression].

c. And thus, as, from the word Ganges &c., we understand the bank of the Ganges &c., so, from the word cow &c., we understand that to be indicated which possesses the nature of a cow.†

d. He lays down the opinion that the form alone is what is meant‡ [by an appellative].

आकृतिसदपेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः ॥ १२८ ॥

Erroneous opinion that the form is what is denoted by an appellative.

Aph. 128.—The form [—says some one, is what is meant by the word], because it is with reference thereto that the determination of the entity is settled.

a. The form is what is meant by the word;—why?—because, —‘of the entity,’ e. g., of an animal, as a cow, ‘the determina-

* एवं स्थानान्मन्त्राः क्रोशन्तीति मन्त्रस्थपुरुषे । तादर्थ्यात् कटं करोतीति कटाथैकवीरणे कटस्यासिद्धत्वेन कारकत्वायोगात् । यमस्य वृत्तादनुशासनादितो राजनियम इति । मानात् आढकेन मिताः सक्तव आढकसक्तव इति । धारणात् तुलया धृतं चन्दनं तुलाचन्दनमिति । सामीप्याद्गङ्गायां गावश्चरन्तीति । कृष्णद्रव्ययोगात् शकटे कृष्णः शकट इत्युदाहरणीयं । प्राणसाधनादन्नं प्राण इति । आधिपत्याद्राजैवास्य कुलमिति कुलाधिपतिः प्रतीयते ॥

† तथाच यथा गङ्गादिपदाद्गङ्गातीरत्वादिना बोधस्तथा गोपदादितो गोत्वविशिष्टस्य लक्षणया बोधः ॥

‡ आकृतिरेव शक्येति मतमुपन्यस्यति ॥

tion is settled,' i. e., there is the settlement of its being such and such a determinate thing,—‘ with reference thereto,’ i. e., with reference to the form:—that is to say, the form alone is what is meant, because it is with reference to the form that the expression “This is a horse,” “This is a cow,” is employed.*

b. He censures this, by means of its fruit,† [i. e., by showing the absurd consequence to which it leads].

व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽप्यप्रसङ्गात् प्रोक्षणादीनां मृद्ववके
जातिः ॥ १२६ ॥

*Absurd consequence of
the opinion.*

Aph. 129.—[Were this so, then,] in an earthenware cow, where, though it possess individuality and the form, we do not find immolation &c., we should find the genus.

a. Since, in an earthenware cow, though it possess individuality and the form [of a cow], we do not meet with its being immolated &c., [as happens to real cattle], the genus of this or that is [at least necessarily included in] the meaning of a word:—otherwise, we should find the earthenware cow also, inasmuch as it is an individual and it has the form of a cow, getting ceremonially immolated:—such is the import.‡

* आकृतिः पदार्थः । कुतः । सत्त्वस्य प्राणिनो गवादे-
व्यवस्थानसिद्धेर्व्यवस्थितत्वसिद्धेस्तदपेक्षत्वादाकृत्यपेक्षत्वादय-
मश्वो गौरयमित्यादिव्यवहारस्याकृत्यपेक्षत्वादाकृतिरेव श-
क्येत्यर्थः ॥

† फलतस्तदूषयति ॥

‡ मृद्ववके व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽपि प्रोक्षणादीनामप्रसङ्गात्
तज्जातिः पदार्थ इतरथा मृद्ववकस्यापि व्यक्तित्वाद्वाकृति-
सत्त्वाच्च वैधप्रोक्षणादिप्रसङ्गादिति भावः ॥

b. Having set aside the opinion that the meaning [of a word] is only the individual or the form, he sets aside the opinion that what is meant is the genus alone.*

नाकृत्यव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वाज्जात्यभिव्यक्तेः ॥ १३० ॥

The genus alone is not what is conveyed by an appellative.

Aph. 130.—Nay [—it is not the genus alone that is meant directly by an appellative—] because it is in reference to the form and to the individual that there is the manifestation of the genus.

a. It is not the genus alone that is meant by the word. Since the 'manifestation of the genus,' i. e., the knowledge, communicated verbally, of the genus, has 'reference to the form and to the individual,' i. e., is determined by its having some form and individual as its object,—these two also are necessarily expressed [directly by the word], because it is impossible that they could be recognised except by the direct meaning,† [seeing that they could not be conveyed by 'Indication' or 'Suggestion,' if not directly denoted. See *Sāhitya-Darpana*, §II., 13 and 23].

b. And thus it is settled that all three are expressed directly :—so he says.‡

जात्याकृत्यव्यक्त्यस्तु पदार्थः ॥ १३१ ॥

* केवलव्यक्त्याकृतिशक्तिपक्षं निराकृत्य केवलजातिशक्तिपक्षं निराकरोति ॥

† न जातिमात्रं पदार्थः । जात्यभिव्यक्तेर्जातिशाब्दबोधस्य आकृत्यव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वादाकृत्यव्यक्तिविषयकत्वनियमात् तयोरपि वाच्यत्वमावश्यकं शक्तिं विना तज्ज्ञानासम्भवात् ॥

‡ इत्थञ्च त्रयाणामपि वाच्यत्वं सिद्धमित्याह ॥

*What is really meant
by an appellative.*

Aph. 131.—But the meaning of a word is the genus and the form and the individual.

a. By the word 'but,' that only one of these is what is meant by a word, is excluded. But the expression 'the meaning of a word' is in the singular, to acquaint us that, though there are three, the power [or direct significance of a word,] is but one.*

b. Though the power [or direct significance of a word,] be indivisible, sometimes one or other [of the three things signified] may [more prominently] present itself. Though the meaning be equal, [in its reference to each of the three,] the pre-eminence belongs to the individual, since it is the subject† [of which the others are the attributes;—so that the word, more strictly, *denotes* the individual and *connotes* its generic properties &c].

c. Since it may be asked, among these what are [what you call] the individual &c.,—he says.‡

व्यक्तिगुणविशेषाश्रयो मूर्तिः ॥ १३२ ॥

*Definition of an
individual.*

Aph. 132.—An individual is something definite, the abode of particular qualities.

a. He defines form.§

आकृतिर्जातिलिङ्गाख्या ॥ १३३ ॥

* तु शब्देनैकमात्रपदार्थत्वव्यवच्छेदः । पदार्थ इत्येकवचनन्तु तिसृष्वप्येकैव शक्तिरिति सूचनाय ॥

† विभिन्नशक्तौ कदाचित् कस्यचिदुपस्थितिः स्यात् । शक्तेस्तुल्यत्वे ऽपि व्यक्तेर्विशेष्यत्वात् प्राधान्यम् ॥

‡ तत्र के व्यक्त्यादय इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

§ आकृतिं लक्षयति ॥

Definition of form. Aph. 133.—The form is what is called the token of the genus.

a. That of which the name is 'the token of the genus:'—for, of the genus cowhood, for example, the token is a certain collocation of dewlap &c.,* [whereby the cow is recognised].

b. He defines genus.†

समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः ॥ १३४ ॥

Definition of genus. Aph. 134.—Genus is that whose nature is to produce the same [conception].

a. That of which the 'nature,' i. e., the essence, is 'to produce,' viz., to produce knowledge,—'the same,' i. e., of the same form, [—knowledge, illustratively, being regarded as taking the form of the object known,—as water takes the form of the receptacle into which it flows] :—and so the meaning is—a fitness to produce knowledge of the same description.‡

b. Here ends the section on the Examination of the Meaning of a Word, and the second Diurnal Portion of the Second Book, namely the Examination of Evidence and its Subservients, by means of the examination of the division thereof.§

* जातिलिङ्गमित्याख्या यस्या जातेर्गोत्वादेर्हि साक्षादिसंस्थानविशेषो लिङ्गम् ॥

† जातिं लक्षयति ॥

‡ समानः समानाकारकः प्रसवो बुद्धिजननं आत्मा स्वरूपं यस्याः सा । तथाच समानाकारबुद्धिजननयोग्यत्वमर्थः ॥

§ समाप्तं शब्दशक्तिपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् । द्वितीयाध्यायस्य

c. The commentary composed by the venerable Viśwanátha Bhaṭṭáchárya, on the Second Book of the Aphorisms of the Nyáya, is finished.*

द्वितीयमाह्निकञ्च विभागपरीक्षाद्वारकसाङ्गप्रमाणपरीक्षणं
नाम ॥

* इति श्रीविश्वनाथभट्टाचार्यकृता न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ द्विती-
याध्यायवृत्तिः समाप्ता ॥

END OF BOOK II.

Blattschütz, on the Second Book of the Aphorisms of the Nyaya.
The commentary composed by the venerable Vāsanatha
is finished.*

OF THE
NĀYAYA
BY
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साहिब से बनी हैं पाठशाला के उपकारार्थ ॥

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Gotama

The aphorisms of the Nyáya philosophy of Gautama printed for the use the
Benares College ...

Bd.: 2

Allahabad 1853

A.or. 4713-2

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10251125-1